November 15: Who
lost and who won?
By Domingo
Amuchastegui
The war
challenge launched by the opposition organization Archipiélago (name with
tourist connotations and nothing mobilizing) with a view to precipitating the
collapse of the Cuban government four months ago and actively seconded by other
opposition groups in Cuba, but mainly by the Cuban exiles in Miami and their
active lobby in Washington, as well as by the European Union (EU), it culminated in a resounding failure.
Despite the overwhelming evidence, Yunior García, manager of the Archipelago,
promised from Havana a march "alone" and cried out – after not
risking to go out on the street – and then claimed to have obtained a
"resounding victory." Yunior insisted that the marches would
continue, without waiting for any programming. Four days later, Yunior appears
in Spain in the company of his wife. Undoubtedly, an outcome nothing heroic ...
Bewilderment has
spread in the ranks of the Archipelago; the mourners cry, consistent
explanations are missing, and only "la repression" is blamed. Already
most of the managing members of the San Isidro movement have chosen to continue
the struggle from Miami, subordinating themselves to the leaders and payrolls
of the so-called "historical exile." This trend now clearly suggests
a "satelization" of this opposition group known as the Archipelago
with respect to the Miami of that exile and the politics of Washington, whether
that of Trump or Biden, and with it his political suicide. It will be very
difficult for them to recover the advertising heyday that preceded November 15
and much more to recover their possible internal implantation.
They do not
quite understand that the struggle for power involves taking all the risks and
deploying the necessary audacity. The "balloon" of November 14 and
15, deflated completely. And now they seek safe haven under the protection of
the United States and there is no shortage of the many who cry out for the
intervention of the powerful power. Continuing to articulate its options, ties
and dependence with Miami and Washington will lead to new failures; they will
be doomed to lose their credibility and mobilizing capacity among many sectors
of the population.
The balance
indicates that the "paid opposition" of the last three decades barely
poked its head in these months and was annulled, this time by the most original
movements known as San Isidro and Archipelago. These set up a second opposition
with more possibilities at first, but frustrated today by the results of
November 15. But, there is still a third side of opposition that continues to
manifest itself actively in the field of ideas and proposals through blogs and
some publications, by old revolutionary "heretics" and young people
who approach them today attracted by their initiatives. This can contribute to
influencing in the short term to promote the processes of change that are
brewing internally. It is a critical opposition "within the
Revolution," a phrase I use to differentiate it from the two mentioned
above.
For its part, the Party-State government has
gloated to claim a total triumph that the evidence seems to confirm. In this
case , unlike On July 11 – there were no demonstrations of any kind, street
clashes or visible police violence. Of course, its mechanisms of intimidation
(both media and police and its supporters) did become visible, showing its
effectiveness. Archipelago and Yunior chose not to challenge them and their
calls to demonstrate fell on deaf ears. Those who promised to reissue a July 11
and achieve an easy triumph, were "left with the desire."
In other words,
these currents of opposition and their powerful external underpinnings may be
within their perfect rights to seek the overthrow of the established power.
But, to the same extent, the Party-State government has the right to fight for
the preservation of its power and its hegemony today quite battered. Imagining
another scenario or scenario is a matter of demagogues or naïve.
As far as the
Party-State government is concerned, there should be no doubt: today it still
enjoys significant support among its supporters. Do you set up a majority?
Undoubtedly, but decreasing. The electoral processes of the last 10 years
showed a growth of negative votes and a sustained rise in abstention levels.
And if July 11 more than confirmed such a decreasing trend, November 15 seems
to show an apparent recovery of such support, which may induce in the Cuban
leadership a kind of triumphalist conviction that may, eventually, lead it to
reaffirm that they are in absolute control of the situation and its most
important tendencies. This would be a gross mistake because the internal and
external dimensions of the crisis facing the country may, spontaneously, lead
to another July 11 or a worse result and that would not be the result of any
internal opposition, but of the insurmountable accumulation of negative factors
by that leadership.
Instead of an
unfounded triumphalism, the Cuban leadership today has to reflect in depth on
its crisis and in the two years that separate it from its next electoral
exercise (2023) what directions and priorities to put into practice. If you
limit themselves to the usual conventional exercise by dint of dedazos (51%)
and with unique candidates, they will most likely have to do "magic"
to sort the numbers in their favor and risk new and older July 11. The
most urgent priorities point in the following directions:
1.
Complete
a comprehensive redesign of the entire system, saving what deserves to be
saved. Put an end to the schemes and supposed foundations that the Party
embodies the State and the nation, the exercise of an absolutism-monopolist and
verticalist that are today proven to be inappropriate. We live in the twenty-first
century not the 60s of the last century.
2.
Explore
the possibilities of an inclusive national dialogue in order to add and not
subtract. Culminate this dialogue in the formation of recognized alternative
political expressions, from "heretics" to indigenous opponents, in no
way tied to the Miami-Washington axis. Adopt substantial modifications at the
constitutional level that enshrine such changes. Coexist with a National
Assembly where different and even oppositional options are heard and debased;
win in the debate of ideas and projects through secret ballots.
3.
Seek a
substantial and sustained flow of foreign investment, seeking its
reincorporation into the World Bank/International Monetary Fund.
4.
Validate
its hegemony with a supreme democratic exercise: broader international
oversight of the 2023 elections. If one is convinced that the majority of the
people are with you, then this exercise of supervision is in no way harmful to
our sovereignty. And if they lose, they will lose legally, hand over the government,
pass to the opposition, and fight for a successful return to government.
(original version)
15 de Noviembre: ¿Quiénes perdieron y quiénes
ganaron?
Por Domingo Amuchastegui
El desafío de guerra lanzado por la organización
opositora Archipiélago (nombre con connotaciones turísticas y nada movilizador)
con miras a precipitar el colapso del gobierno cubano hace cuatro meses y
activamente secundado por otros grupos opositores en Cuba, pero principalmente
por los exiliados cubanos en Miami y su activo lobby en Washington, asi como
por la Unión Europea (UE), culminó en un sonado fracaso. Pese a la abrumadora
evidencia, Yunior García, gestor de Archipiélago, prometía desde La Habana una
marcha “en solitario” y clamaba -tras no arriesgarse a salir a la calle- para
luego afirmar haber obtenido una “victoria rotunda.” Yunior insistía en que las
marchas continuarían, sin esperar programación alguna. Cuatro dias más tarde,
Yunior aparece por España en compañía de su esposa. Sin dudas, un desenlace
nada heroíco…
El desconcierto ha cundido en las filas de
Archipiélago; lloran las plañideras, faltan las explicaciones consistentes y
sólo se culpa a “la repression”. Ya la mayoría de los miembros gestores del
movimiento San Isidro ha optado por continuar la lucha desde Miami,
subordinándose a los dirigentes y nóminas del llamado “exilio histórico.” Esta
tendencia sugiere claramente ahora una “satelización” de esta agrupación
opositora conocida como Archipiélago con respecto al Miami de dicho exilio y la
política de Washington, sea la de Trump o la de Biden, y con ello su suicidio
político. Muchísimo les costará recuperar el apogeo publicitario que
precedieron al 15 de Noviembre y muchísimo más remontar su posible implantación
interna.
No acaban de entender que la lucha por el poder
supone asumir todos los riesgos y desplegar la audacia necesaria. El “globo”
del 14 y 15 de Noviembre, se desinfló por completo. Y ahora buscan refugio
seguro al amparo de EEUU y no faltan dentro de estos los muchos que a gritos
piden la intervención de la poderosa potencia. Seguir articulando sus opciones,
nexos y dependencia con Miami y Washington, conducirá a nuevos fracasos;
estarán condenados a perder su credibilidad y capacidad movilizativa entre
muchos sectores de la población.
El balance indica que la “oposición pagada” de
las últimas tres décadas apenas asomó la cabeza en estos meses y quedó anulada,
esta vez por los movimientos más originales
conocidos como San Isidro y Archipiélago. Estos configuraron una segunda
oposición con más posibilidades al principio, pero frustradas hoy por los
resultados del 15 de Noviembre. Pero, todavía existe una tercera vertiente de
oposición que sigue manifestándose activamente en el terreno de las ideas y las
propuestas mediante blogs y algunas publicaciones, por viejos revolucionarios
“herejes” y gente joven que se les acerca atraídos hoy por sus iniciativas.
Esto puede contribuir a influir en el corto plazo a impulsar a los procesos de
cambio que se gestan en lo interno. Es una oposición crítica “dentro de la
Revolución,” frase que utilizo para diferenciarla de las dos antes mencionadas.
Por su
lado, el gobierno Partido-Estado se ha regodeado en reclamar un triunfo total
que la evidencia parece confirmar. En este caso -a diferencia del 11 de Julio-
no se registraron manifestaciones de tipo alguno, choques callejeros o
violencia policial visible. Eso sí, sus mecanismos de intimidación (tanto
mediáticos como policiales y de sus partidarios) sí se hicieron visibles,
mostrando su eficacia. Archipiélago y Yunior optaron por no desafiarlos y sus
llamados a manifestarse cayeron en oídos sordos. Los que prometían reeditar un
11 de Julio y alcanzar un triunfo fácil, se “quedaron con las ganas.”
En otras palabras, esas corrientes de oposición y
sus poderoso sustentos externos pueden estar en su perfecto derecho de procurar
el derrocamiento del poder establecido. Pero, en esa misma medida tiene el
gobierno del Partido-Estado el derecho a batirse por la conservación de su
poder y de su hegemonía hoy bastante maltrecha. Imaginar otro panorama o escenario
es cosa de demagogos o ingenuos.
En lo que respecta al gobierno del Partido-Estado
no deben albergarse dudas: hoy todavía goza de un respaldo significativo entre
sus partidarios. ¿Configuran una mayoría? Sin dudas, pero decreciente. Los
procesos electorales de los últimos 10 años mostraron un crecimiento de votos
negativos y un ascenso sostenido de los niveles de abstención. Y si el 11 de
Julio confirmó con creces semejante tendencia decreciente, el 15 de Noviembre parece
mostrar una aparente recuperación de semejante respaldo, lo que puede inducir
en la dirigencia cubana una suerte de convicción triunfalista que puede,
eventualmente, llevarla a reafirmar que están en control absoluto de la
situación y sus tendencias más importantes. Esto sería un craso error pues las
dimensiones internas y externas de la crisis que enfrenta el país pueden,
espontáneamente, desembocar en otro 11 de Julio o un resultado peor y que no
sería resultado de ninguna oposición interna, sino de la acumulación
insuperable de factores negativos por parte de esa dirigencia.
En lugar de un infundado triunfalismo, tiene la
dirigencia cubana hoy que reflexionar en profundidad sobre su crisis y en los
dos años que la separan de su próximo ejercicio electoral (2023) qué rumbos y prioridades poner en
práctica. Si se limita al ejercicio convencional de siempre a fuerza de dedazos
(51%) y con candidatos únicos, lo más probable es que tengan que hacer “magia”
para ordenar los números en su favor y arriesgar nuevos y mayores 11 de Julio. Las prioridades más urgentes apuntan
en las siguientes direcciones:
1.
Completar un rediseño integral de la
totalidad del sistema, salvando lo que merezca ser salvado. Poner fin a los
esquemas y supuestos fundamentos de que el Partido encarna el Estado y la
nación, el ejercicio de un absolutismo-monopolista y verticalista que son hoy
probadamente improcedentes. Vivimos en el siglo XXI no los 60s del siglo
pasado.
2.
Explorar las posibilidades de un
diálogo nacional incluyente a fin de sumar y no restar. Culminar este diálogo
en la formación de expresiones políticas alternativas reconocidas, desde
“herejes” hasta opositores autóctonos, en nada atados al eje Miami-Washington.
Adoptar modificaciones sustanciales en el plano constitucional que consagren
semejantes cambios. Convivir con una Asamblea Nacional donde se escuchen y
debatan opciones distintas y hasta opositoras; ganar en el debate de ideas y
proyectos mediante las votaciones secretas.
3.
Procurar un flujo sustantancial y
sostenido de inversión extranjera, procurando su reincorporación al Banco
Mundial/Fondo Monetario Internacional.
4.
Validar su hegemonía con un ejercicio
democrático supremo: la supervisión internacional más amplia de las elecciones
del 2023. Si se está convencido de que la mayoría del pueblo está contigo,
entonces este ejercicio de supervisión no es en modo alguno lesivo a nuestra
soberanía. Y si pierden, perderán legalmente, entregarán el gobierno, pasarán a
la oposición y lucharán por un regreso exitoso al gobierno.
"We change or we sink"
written by Domingo Amuchastegui 26 July 2021
published by La Joven Cuba
"We change or we sink," a sentence that heralded profound transformations, was uttered by Raul more than a decade ago. A little later, Fidel Castro said when referring to socialism: «This does not serve us or us...». Such statements — in addition to being indisputable truths — seemed to promise significant changes. false. Quite the opposite has happened.
Today we are looking at a reality that painfully hints at a marked setback. July 11 and subsequent incidents mark the sinking of the old model on which he wanted to perpetuate an exhausted experience.
Let's examine some key points:
1. I do not give credit to the United States; to Cuban Miami; to the paid opposition (as I have always characterized it) that has been trying for more than six decades to blow up the country like a pressure cooker (a thesis advocated since 1960); nor to the criminals who always accompany such social outbursts, of being the managers and inspirers of 7/11/21.
In particular, let us stop blaming all our ills on the empire. From Washington to Calle 8, and to the wage earners on the island; they were all taken by surprise by the events of that day, as also happened with the Cuban rulers. Obviously, hostile factors immediately try to capitalize on what happened through their media scaffolding.
2. I support the view that what happened is typically a spontaneous social explosion of considerable extent, encompassing numerous provinces and cities and involving thousands of people. It shows a social composition where areas and neighborhoods of recognized poverty are distinguished and in which blacks and young people stand out, pillars of the revolution in past decades.
There has been no lack of expressions of a kind of neo-annexationism, with many symbols of the United States flying, while in the streets of Miami, time and again, intervention by Washington was called for, which is the absolute sum of all solutions.
3. On the other hand, both parties claim a monopoly of the term people. Big mistake. Large segments of village are located on both sides. There are thousands of Cubans protesting and thousands still on the side of the government; a scenario reminiscent of "masses against masses". Such polarization stems from the current situation of hardship, extreme shortages, total lack of incentives (both material and socio-cultural), dollarization (beyond what is usual in the Cuban context) and, in particular, the reaction to the effects of the so-called "Ordering".
I attach particular importance to the latter. For thirty years it was said and repeated that the Cuban leadership would never apply a "shock therapy", but, in practice, the "Ordering" resulted precisely in a monumental "shock therapy" that left the vast majority of the population in a situation in which prices and wages became antagonistic categories, fueled by hyperinflation.
4. Computerization and social networks introduced an unprecedented multiplier and sudden dynamic, which was attempted to be silenced by the state's cyber monopolies. This was a futile act of political cowardice.
Who benefits from shutting down the Internet and other services? The Cuban government? Certainly not. It benefits opponents and discredits the one who does.
5. The essential responsibility for all this lies in the institutionalized resistance to any significant change, with a comprehensive approach and that supposes a comprehensive redesign of the proven inoperative model that has rested on a set of absolutist-ist dogmas such as Party-State, Party of the Cuban Nation, totally inadequate and overcome after sixty-two years of the revolutionary triumph.
The urgency of such changes became apparent in 1980 with the Mariel episode. Nothing was done, it was a case of dismissing everyone as 'scum', and the rigidity of the system was reinforced. The so-called Rectification of Errors of 1986 gave rise to hopes of change, but without providing anything effective. In 1991, prior to the Fourth Party Congress, a wave of proposals for radical changes arose at the time of the discussion of the Call to the Fourth Congress.
The response of the Party leadership was one of total rejection and severe recriminations and warnings. Once again, this leadership liquidated any possibility of change, including the expansion of the process of Economic Improvement promoted by them and that was advocated by the FAR since the early eighties.
6. With the collapse of real socialism and the Soviet Union (1989-1991), the ideal juncture arose to promote a comprehensive remodeling; however, nothing was done, but the absolutist mechanisms, the buckling, were deepened. The adoption of some patches, here or there, achieved little in the already urgent need for profound transformations.
The argument that 'if we loosen up, the situation gets out of hand', prevailed again and again. Meanwhile, the corruption and enrichment of many leaders, their children and grandchildren — including accounts and trips abroad — and, with it, a marked erosion of the moral authority that must distinguish any leader, became increasingly visible — becoming a popular talk.
7. Cuban leaders began to live with their backs to reality, refusing to perceive that the eras and values had changed, that the younger generations were no longer the enthusiastic revolutionaries of the sixties or the obedient militants of other decades; that sixty years do not pass for pleasure and that the mechanisms of communication and interconnection from one generation to another are fundamentally modified. For these leaders, time inside the country seemed to have stopped.
8. At the height of the SIXTH Party Congress, winds of change seemed to blow, but without culminating in anything real. The Seventh Congress would result in the suppression of such possibilities and a strong countercurrent to some of the measures or patches Once again the reverse was imposed.
9. Then came the VIII Congress (April 2021) without building broad debates and preliminary consensus, despite the fact that the levels of poverty and deprivation reached unsuspected levels and of an almost impossible to imagine severity, worsened by Trump's economic war and the pandemic. The VIII Congress could represent the milestone or turn towards a path of profound transformations. But it wasn't.
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