Saturday, February 14, 2026

Carlos Alzugaray, The Cuban Dilemma; La Joven Cuba, Sovereignty

 Reform and overcome the crisis, or not reform and collapse, that is the Cuban dilemma.

 

There is no doubt that Cuba faces one of the most perilous, if not the most perilous, crossroads in its history. 

The future of the nation as we know it, with all its virtues and flaws, its strengths and weaknesses, is at stake.The traditional enemies of the Cuban nation aspire to achieve their goals with more force than ever after what happened in Caracas on January 3 and the publication of the Executive Order by US President Donald Trump on the 19th of that same month.  

Taking advantage of the current critical situation in the country, the United States government is trying to wipe the slate clean of the last 67 years of Cuban history.

If that were to happen, Cubans would lose all possibility of self-determination. The centuries-old emancipatory aspirations of our most eminent heroes would collapse. Cuba would never again be the nation dreamed of by Martí, Céspedes, Agramonte, Ana Betancourt, Mariana Grajales, Maceo, Gómez, Marta Abreu, Mella, Guiteras…

Simultaneously, the country is experiencing a polycrisis resulting from the confluence of two distinct but linked phenomena. On the one hand, there are the 64 years of economic warfare unleashed by the United States in 1962, under the premise that applying economic sanctions to Cubans should produce "hunger, desperation, and the overthrow of the government," as argued in the Mallory Memorandum of April 1960. And on the other hand, there are the deficiencies and shortcomings that the Cuban government has demonstrated in economic policy over the last eight years.

Unfortunately, as in other stages of Cuba's history, there are compatriots who support this hostile US policy towards the nation in the false belief that our salvation and well-being lie in accepting subordination to a foreign state.

They forget all the warnings of José Martí and the history of 57 years of subjugation to the United States, which also did not make us a prosperous country, no matter how much they try to sell images of a luminous Havana that contrasted with the poverty and inequality in the rest of the country.

Other compatriots are so overwhelmed by the difficulties of recent years that they go so far as to deny the real achievements of the revolutionary project in its first stage. Their reasoning is naive: "The Americans need to come and fix this."

That fateful phrase is heard more and more each day in the streets of our cities.

Finally, as often happens in other countries and contexts, there are compatriots who cling to a past that will not return and oppose even an axiom that Fidel Castro himself defended: change everything that needs to be changed.

The convergence of these three trends condemns the country to something Raúl Castro predicted more than 15 years ago. Either we correct course, or we will plunge into an abyss. In other words, inevitable collapse.

In his address to the press on February 5 , President Miguel Díaz-Canel referred to specific changes but avoided discussing comprehensive reform. The Cuban state representative used the word "change" four times, in reference to issues such as the basic food basket, the import-dependent mentality, the energy matrix, and the leadership of the party. Similarly, the concept of "transformation" was used only five times, also for specific topics: the digital transformation and the development of artificial intelligence (with the country practically shut down), making the state apparatus more economically sustainable, municipal autonomy, encouraging Cubans living abroad to participate in the country's development, and the energy transition.

However, at a time when the country clearly needs a far-reaching economic reform and the beginning of a gradual political reform that makes the system of relations between citizens and the State more efficient and responsive than ever before, it is striking that the top leader of the party and the government himself has not addressed such a relevant issue at such a critical moment as the need for reform.

This issue has been on the national agenda since a series of substantive changes were implemented in the 1990s by Fidel Castro himself: legalization of foreign currency holdings and opening to foreign investment; expansion of self-employment; and creation of Basic Units of Agricultural Production.

On the political front, the founder of the Revolution himself proposed and promoted the reform of the Constitution in 1992, which also included an electoral transformation: the deputies to the National Assembly of People's Power began to be ratified by the citizens (until then they had been indirectly ratified by the delegates to the Provincial Assemblies).  

At the end of the first decade and the beginning of the second of this century, during his first terms, Raúl Castro promoted another wave of reforms, including one of a political nature of great importance to the citizenry that in 2013 broke with years of restrictive practices: A new immigration law.

The struggle between supporters and opponents of reforms today was bluntly addressed in these pages by my young colleague Rubén Padrón Garriga in his video entitled "The Counter-Reform," in which he pointed out that "denying reform is condemning the people to misery."

The reforms and the current national and international context

The current national and international context is extremely serious, and demonstrates something about which there can be no confusion: the most serious contradiction faced, as in other historical stages, is that which opposes the imperial ambitions of certain circles of power in the United States to the Cuban aspirations of a free and sovereign, prosperous and democratic, just and equitable homeland.

The US administration of President Trump, in which Marco Rubio, a figure consumed by an innate and perverse hatred, plays a decisive role, is prepared to do anything, even unleash a military aggression, to achieve the longed-for dream of a "regime change".

For Rubio, his collaborators, and a growing number of Cuban emigrants, "regime change" is practically equivalent to an unconditional surrender, not only of the government, but also of the Cuban people on the Island.

If Cuba "collapses," as is widely believed to be inevitable, we would all be subject to its rule. It would be naive to think otherwise.

Trump himself has hinted at what could be done in Cuba and who he is most interested in supporting: "dismantling" the country to provoke a rupture in the national political process for the benefit of the Cubans who make up the majority of the diaspora in the United States.

Of course, any promise from Donald Trump is highly uncertain. Just look at the way Cubans are being treated, even those who voted for him in 2024. There are increasing arrests, deportations, and mistreatment, even of those who are already citizens.

Cubans residing in the neighboring country to the north who supported Trump and Rubio a year ago should reflect on this before continuing to call for an invasion, a naval blockade of oil imports, or other military action.

Trump, Rubio, and a growing number of Cuban Americans are also convinced that, due to the shortcomings and errors of the Cuban government, the necessary conditions have been created to bring about the "collapse" of Cuba, its economy, and its government. President Donald Trump's Executive Order of January 19, 2026, is clearly designed to provoke that collapse through energy strangulation. This constitutes an act of war against an entire people who pose no threat to the United States.

Therefore, the challenge for Cuba and for Cubans living here is obvious. There is no possibility of lifting the blockade, or even easing it. We must overcome it with effective economic policies that transcend our external dependence.

To this contradiction between the Cuban people and the imperialist power circles within the United States is added another extremely important one, that which exists within Cuban society between those who govern it and the citizens who aspire to well-being and prosperity, and do not see in the former as decision-makers capable of producing the necessary changes.

Those Cubans inside and outside Cuba who believe the issue can be resolved with a complete break and the removal from power of all those currently in government would do well to reflect on what is happening and what could happen, based on what has occurred in other countries occupied and dominated by the United States. Along with the current government, there is an attempt to erase all the positive aspects of the revolutionary process in its early years (universal access to healthcare and education, easier access to housing, etc.).

They would impose a "Made in Miami" government on us, one that would only answer to the interests of the United States and the Cuban-American right wing in that Florida city. This wouldn't result in "first-world capitalism" but, as has already happened in other countries subservient to Washington, we would end up with an extractive system whose benefits wouldn't go to the Cuban people, but to the foreign companies that exploit our resources. There are notable differences between Washington, D.C., and San Juan.

And what about democracy and human rights? Donald Trump has already shown that he's not interested in them. And not just in Cuba or Venezuela. He wants to annex Canada and Greenland without consulting their citizens in the slightest.

Overcoming the crisis by intensifying the path of reform

Therefore, the only path forward for us Cubans living on the island is to do everything necessary to ensure that the Cuban economy, which has been declining for several years, recovers and begins to develop, so that our citizens can have access to the decent life they so rightfully deserve. And that depends exclusively on the highest authorities in the country. Not on the provinces, not on the municipalities, and not on the average Cuban.

The demand for reforms, primarily economic but also political, is a natural consequence of the times we live in. This is especially true when we see on the National Television News that our leaders, with a few exceptions, continue to repeat past formulas and refuse not only to change, but also to clearly acknowledge the numerous mistakes they have made.

The figures are compelling. GDP, export volume, and productivity continue to decline, while socially, infant mortality and population aging are increasing due to low fertility and the growing migration of young people of working age.

Against the backdrop of these two contradictions, Cuba is embroiled in a bitter struggle between those who, as citizens and even as rank-and-file party members, consider deepening reforms essential, and those in power who postpone changing everything that needs changing, hiding behind the slogan of "continuity." The latter have held sway and maintained control of power, including the mass media.

In these cases, one tactic often used by those who defend the status quo has been the supremacy of their outdated discourse in state media, particularly television.

They reject and stigmatize anyone who thinks differently and proposes changing everything that needs changing. They defame and vilify them with the most implausible accusations. The tone of these assertions is harsh, sectarian, and oppressive.

There is nothing new in these accusations. They have been seen before, such as in 2016 when, for example, a campaign was waged against so-called "centrism."

But there is an aggravating factor. The critical nature of the moment. These are not times for division, but for unity and growth. These are not times to plot against patriotic Cubans simply because they hold a different opinion.

The solid arguments of Cuban specialists of the highest national and international prestige on the need for reforms are opposed by arguments that are difficult to sustain in a serious academic debate.

As on other occasions, regarding the specific case of reform, the essay "Reform or Revolution?" by the courageous German-Polish leader Rosa Luxemburg is cited out of context. It is superficial to argue that this debate can be generalized beyond its specific content as if our current situation were the same as that specific dilemma addressed in that text, which resulted from the internal conflict within German social democracy in the last decade of the 19th century.

As is well known, that debate concerned the Erfurt Program and the best strategy for overthrowing capitalism and building socialism in Germany. In other words, the discussion centered on the strategy for a socialist or social-democratic party to seize power and the radical nature of the path to follow once in power in order to overcome capitalism.

But the Luxembourg conclusions that are usually cited have nothing to do with our specific situation and what is being debated: the need for reforms in the socialism of present-day Cuba. The aim is to make proposals to change everything that needs to be changed so that Cuban socialism can achieve its intended goal: a prosperous, sustainable, just, and equitable society.

It is clear that current policies have not yielded results in this regard.

A better approach to the meaning of reforms within a socialist system may be that of a well-known academic in Cuba, Atilio Borón, who in 2008, referring precisely to the Cuban and Venezuelan experiences within the concept of 21st Century Socialism, stated:

“The absurdity of anathematizing any reform as a heresy or a betrayal of socialism—understood as an unalterable dogma not only in terms of principles, what is right, but also in terms of historical projects, what is wrong—is obvious, because it would mean the consecration of a suicidal immobility, the denial of the capacity for self-correction of errors and a renunciation of collective learning, conditions that are essential for the permanent improvement of socialism.” [1]

What has damaged the Cuban economy most is not the reform approved 15 years ago, as its opponents argue, but rather the deliberate and consistent failure to implement it. There are many examples: the inexplicable delay in implementing the monetary and exchange rate unification, originally scheduled for 2016 but postponed until 2020, or the current surprising delay in passing a law on businesses, to name just two.

Cuban academics from different generations and professions have been subjecting the country's reality to serious and objective analysis. They do so without resorting to slogans or subterfuges that attempt to sugarcoat the multifaceted crisis we are experiencing. They do so in institutional spaces such as the Economic Society of Friends of the Country, the Center for Studies of the Cuban Economy, and the "Last Thursdays of Topics" forum. They do so publicly, in full view of the citizenry.

They fulfill something that Julio Carranza argued more than 18 years ago:

"There is a public service responsibility on the part of the scientist and scientific institutions, which consists of the direct communication to society of specialized information and analysis; not as a political proposal, but as well-founded interpretations that contribute to raising culture and general knowledge on different subjects." [2]

Among the opponents of reform, a rigid view of orthodox Marxism prevails. This view dominated the Soviet Union for over 60 years of its existence and prevented timely reforms. As a result, by the time reform proponents finally managed to push it forward starting in 1985, it was too late. The economic stagnation resulting from the ossification and sclerosis of Marxist thought had undermined the foundations of socialism in the USSR.

The paths taken by the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam were quite different. In both countries, reformist factions within their respective communist parties successfully implemented transformations that opened their economies to market forces. The evidence of the success of their reforms is clear. In both countries, there was no hesitation in addressing reforms with the utmost seriousness and depth. The people of both countries enjoy the benefits of prosperous and resilient economies.

Cuba must find the path of its reforms or else we all risk an unacceptable setback that we do not deserve after so much sacrifice.


[1] Borón, Atilio, Socialism 21st Century: Is there life after neoliberalism?, Buenos Aires, Luxemburg Editions, 2008, page 117.

[2] “The commitment of science and the science of commitment”, Temas , No. 53: 143-154, January-March 2008, p. 147.

https://jovencuba.com/reformar-superar-crisis/

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In Cuban political history, sovereignty has always been linked to a specific aspiration. For generations, the ultimate goal was to see Cuba free from all external domination, first from Spain and then from U.S. tutelage. 

After 1959, although resources and public services were nationalized, economic dependence on the former Soviet Union conditioned national policy and left the economy unprotected, to such an extent that it was devastated after the fall of the socialist bloc. 

That thread runs through Cuban political thought and action, and reappears time and again like a sword of Damocles in the country's public debate. Therefore, every negotiation under asymmetrical conditions brings back the dilemma of how far to negotiate without compromising what is considered non-negotiable.  

This tension is currently manifesting itself in the Venezuelan case, whose government is signaling a willingness to negotiate with the United States on terms that go beyond conventional diplomatic exchange. The licenses granted to US companies to operate in the oil sector, the talks on production and exports, and the specific agreements reached regarding prisoners and cooperation indicate a restructuring of the relationship on clearly asymmetrical grounds. US media outlets such as The New York Times recently reported that, according to statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Venezuelan government will submit a monthly budget to the White House to authorize the use of oil revenues. In general, the concessions being hinted at encompass strategic resources, economic maneuvering margins, and areas that, in a scenario of full autonomy, would not be part of a negotiation process.

For its part, the US is once again presenting itself as having the right to intervene, dictate, and condition the political course of Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine, revived since the Trump era , has explicitly reappeared, to the point that there is talk of a "Donroe Doctrine" as a contemporary reformulation of the old postulate: that of Latin America as a natural sphere of influence, available for external pressure and conditioning.  

However, the return to the logic of regional "influence" clashes with the normative framework that has formally governed international relations since the mid-20th century. The Charter of the United Nations recognizes the legal equality of states and the right of each country to freely decide its political, economic, and social organization without external interference; this framework does not distinguish between large and small countries nor does it grant privileges based on the power of each state, although in practice it is precisely the "strongest" that most frequently violate it.

The gap between international norms and political practice has always existed, but it is becoming more evident these days outside of direct sanctions. Even in countries with very different histories, including US allies, discourses are beginning to emerge that question this relationship more explicitly. 

In a recent statement, Mark Carney, the Prime Minister of Canada, emphasized the need to rethink his country's economic development as a middle power and its international integration, without taking for granted a structural dependence on Washington, and he did so by speaking in terms of autonomy and national decision-making capacity.

In Mexico, President Claudia Sheinbaum insists on defending sovereignty, emphasizing that cooperation should not be confused with relinquishing control over strategic matters. Without equating contexts or situations, these positions show that the issue of autonomy is once again at the forefront of regional debate, as a concern linked to the capacity of states to strengthen their internal decision-making power, redefine their subordinations, and establish foreign relations from less asymmetrical positions.

Throughout its existence as a republic, Cuba has been a central stage for the debate surrounding power asymmetry and respect for state autonomy. In recent history, the United States' unilateral coercive measures were conceived as a long-term mechanism to negatively impact the environment in which the island structures its economic development, foreign policy, and internal order. Their effects permeate daily life in numerous ways, serving as a visible factor affecting citizens, but also, all too often, as the sole argument used to justify poor domestic policy decisions and the absence of profound transformations.

If countries with consolidated economies and greater room for maneuver prioritize the need to strengthen themselves internally to expand their autonomy and trade relations with various international actors, it is difficult to justify why Cuba, with its accumulated structural problems and a far more fragile social situation, can continue postponing the internal decisions it needs. The economic situation, the deterioration of living conditions, and institutional erosion allow for no further delays. Sovereignty as a principle is non-negotiable, but in political practice, it is sustained primarily by the well-being, or the hope for it, as a generator of consensus around a national project worth defending.

It is no coincidence that governments find it more difficult to preserve values ​​and the capacity for self-determination when the lives of their population are reproduced in precarious conditions… Deciding to make profound transformations, therefore, is a duty towards that population and must be part of a process that is its own, internal and sovereign to the country, not as a response to demands from foreign governments and external agendas. 

Without having to look far, Puerto Rico exemplifies the reach an external agenda can have. For decades, the island's identity has been subject to external manipulation, and while its relationship with the U.S. has brought economic and financial benefits to certain sectors, the price has been high in political, cultural, and social terms. The inability to fully determine its status, its development model, and its place in the world has transformed this relationship into a form of neocolonialism that remains a subject of dispute and challenge. This is why Puerto Rican intellectuals and artists have been pointing out for years that no amount of material prosperity can compensate for the loss of self-government or the subordination of their collective project.

Sovereignty is a concrete political condition that is either exercised or lost. There is no possible compatibility between a sovereign national project and any form of annexation or submission to external interests. Any formula that transfers control of central areas of the nation to foreign actors seriously compromises the possibility of building an independent project. Ultimately, the discussion comes down to the kind of country one is willing to defend and bequeath, an idea that Villena summarized in the desire that "our children not beg on their knees for the homeland that their parents won for us standing tall."

https://jovencuba.com/soberania-no-negociable/

Wednesday, February 4, 2026

Rafael Hernandez on US-Cuba Negotiations

 

Cuba and the U.S.: Memo on dialogue, understanding and negotiation

Continuing to associate reforms and their implementation with the “pragmatic” management of relations with the U.S. not only ignores the causes of the deterioration of relations, but also confuses the terms of our problems. 

https://oncubanews.com/opinion/columnas/con-todas-sus-letras/cuba-y-ee-uu-memo-sobre-dialogo-entendimiento-y-negociacion/
I like to remind everyone that when it comes to baseball, hurricanes, and relations with the U.S., all Cubans are experts. 

The ways in which these three “expertises” are exercised, however, tend to differ markedly. As prima facie evidence , one need only look at how many polarized opinions and bitter debates circulate on social media about baseball and hurricanes, compared to all that is said, proposed, predicted, and cursed about the relationship between our two countries. 

Having dedicated a longer part of my life to researching them than I should have, and having been wrong many times, I am still fascinated by the way they are discussed, especially because of their frequent assertiveness and subjectivity.

Indeed, few issues stir up as much frustration, expectation, and “definitive solutions” as this one. Even among those who repeatedly claim that the blockade isn't the root of all our problems, many behave as if “normal relations” could resolve almost everything. Whether the island becomes that kind of imagined promised land—prosperous, sustainable, and democratic, a place no one wants to leave—seems to depend on our relationship with them. 

And although their policies remind us time and again of the imperialist nature that continues to govern them, we dream of a future in which we can experience our proximity as good neighborliness and a shared cultural legacy, instead of in an adverse and predominant geopolitical condition. 

This subjectivization of relationships also tends to project the frustrations and disagreements of many with the Cuban government, which are in themselves quite understandable, to attribute to it the cause of the impasse, the setbacks or aggravations they experience. 

As if it were a condition made chronic by ineptitude in treating it, instead of a configuration of asymmetrical powers, whose cycles of polarization and approximation have been determined by the great power, as can be verified by a simple inspection of history. 

Lately, I have tried to explore the picture of these relationships by resorting to the classic triangle US-Latin America+Caribbean-Cuba, looking in it for explanations about what is happening or could happen in its dynamics, as an alternative to the subjectivist approach. 

The key triangle: US-Cuba-Latin America

Under the shocking effect of the Venezuelan crisis, and the cloud of rushed speeches and moralizing that accompanied it, I tried to examine the fundamental differences between the Venezuelan scenario and our own, and appreciate the limits to a military escalation against Cuba, without underestimating the dangers and real costs posed by the increased aggression of the U.S. 

I would like to go back a little further now and revisit the last phase of rapprochement we had. This is not only because the mutual interests that fostered it remain, but also because, particularly on the Cuban side, some of the actors who participated in that understanding are still alive. 

And, above all, to learn from the stark differences between these two circumstances. This is something that must be carefully considered in politics, since not everything depends on the good or ill will of the parties involved, even though voluntarism is a characteristic of our political culture—that of both sides. It's not always, in fact almost never, that "where there's a will, there's a way."       

Just 12 years ago, the Cuban and U.S. governments negotiated and agreed to nothing less than the normalization of diplomatic relations. They reached that point thanks to a long and complicated dialogue on prisoner exchanges, which was possible because there was a limited time to achieve such an agreement on the U.S. side. 

Indeed, if Alan Gross had died of a heart attack in a Cuban prison, the Obama administration would have paid a very high political price. Therefore, the urgency of reaching an agreement within a specific timeframe outweighed the asymmetry of power and interests between the two sides. 

I suppose I don't need to demonstrate that the initiative for this rapprochement came from the US, since Cuba's receptive attitude toward negotiation and its willingness to "talk about any subject" had been present since Raúl Castro assumed the presidency (2008). Although Obama had announced a change in policy toward Cuba during his election campaign (2008) and had later promised it to the countries of the region (2009), it had not yet materialized, apart from some minor adjustments. 

By the end of 2014, however, this initiative had the advantage of being relatively inexpensive to implement. Favorable factors included the fact that the final two years of the presidential term were approaching; that the majority of U.S. public opinion favored an agreement; and that a growing number of Cuban emigrants had endorsed a détente agenda that would facilitate travel and remittances. 

On the international stage, all the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean, and also the European allies, regardless of their ideological positions, thought the same. 

Debate, dialogue, differentiate. Travel notes

The only obstacle was the lobby of hardline Cuban Americans in South Florida. But it wasn't the first time the U.S. government had overruled that lobby when it came to a matter that truly mattered. 

Even with this favorable situation, Pope Francis's mediation was necessary to break the deadlock and facilitate the dialogue that led to the prisoner exchange. That dialogue, and the resulting agreement, served as a springboard for something unexpected: the restoration of diplomatic relations, known as "normalization." Why?

Obama never promised to normalize relations. It would have provoked opposition in Congress, within sectors of the bureaucracy itself, as well as from all the operators and stakeholders in the anti-Castro industry, especially in South Florida. 

We can admit that he had that secret intention; but we know that secret intentions or what they would have liked to do does not always lead to actions that are convenient for politicians. 

The fact is that, beyond those inclinations and conveniences, it could be estimated with certainty that the release and exchange of prisoners, once it was a fait accompli , was going to awaken that same reaction and generate a fixed, predictable political cost. 

To put it in terms of marginalist cost-benefit theory: to what extent was the normalization—that is, the elevation to embassy status of the interests sections in Havana and Washington, existing since 1977—going to generate a superlative marginal cost? And it turned out to be minimal.

In addition to having the support of all the actors and favorable currents mentioned above, including the silent majority of emigration, the Obama administration could then afford to invest its remaining political capital in a small business like the Cuba issue, make it flourish over the next 25 months, and turn it into an important topic of its legacy. 

To achieve this, he relied on the cooperation of the Cuban government, which did not demand the lifting of the embargo as a precondition for declaring normalization. Speaking of concessions, none of those that made the rapprochement and progress in relations possible in 2015-2016 can compare to this one.

It goes without saying that economic interests were not the driving force behind this policy on the US side. But the national security interests shared by both sides were not insignificant. A review of the 23 agreements reached before Obama left the White House confirms this.

What happened on the Cuban side, and what costs had to be paid? As might be expected, the vast majority of Cubans overwhelmingly supported normalization. Many celebrated it as a triumph of national sovereignty. They anticipated that, even without the lifting of the embargo, it was a step in that direction, and they began to reap the direct benefits of détente: the increase in visits from Americans and Cuban-Americans, greater flexibility in visa issuance, commercial flights between various U.S. cities and Cuban provinces, the surge in licenses for cultural and academic exchanges, and so on. Various groups of Cubans took advantage of these advances, in addition to all that was achieved in terms of cooperation between the two governments.

Cuba and the US: Lessons and Counter-lessons from the Intervention in Venezuela

The main cost, in my opinion, was precisely in the link that was created, subjectively, between the progress of the reform program, approved three years earlier, and the process of normalization in bilateral relations. 

Undoubtedly, the expectation of improved relations became an objective factor, catapulting Cuba's foreign relations and expanding them beyond the U.S. During the two years of normalization, more dignitaries and high-level government representatives from around the world visited the island than ever before—by my count, an average of two per week. 

If those expectations were not met, it wasn't precisely due to a lack of pragmatism in Cuban politics, the predominance of a conservative style that paralyzed ongoing changes, closed off the space and legitimacy of the private sector, or responded to a besieged fortress mentality. Rather, it was due to the shift in US policy, especially since the summer of 2017, when the "sonic attacks" literally paralyzed compliance with migration agreements, the main axis of understanding and cooperation between the two sides since 1995.

Continuing to associate reforms and their implementation with the “pragmatic” management of relations with the U.S. not only ignores the causes of the deterioration of relations, but also confuses the terms of our problems. 

Should continuing to support the private and cooperative sectors; guaranteeing the expression of public opinion and the real autonomy of the media; the place of emigrants and their citizenship status; and continuing to produce legislation that empowers municipalities, recognizes associations, human rights, etc., as provided for in the Constitution, be made viable to become a negotiable agenda with the US? 

Defending reforms in the realm of domestic policy as essential to fostering socioeconomic development, making social services sustainable, increasing and distributing well-being, citizen participation and control, as well as strengthening autonomy in foreign relations, facilitating alliances, and diversifying dependencies, gives the reforms a meaning that forms part of Cuba's international projection. But there is a long way to go from there to creating a framework that gives them meaning as a bargaining chip in international negotiations. 

It is important to remember that the purpose of reforms in a socialist policy is to engage with, foster, and legitimize consensus. Otherwise, it becomes merely a technocratic exercise or a simple adaptation to the international order and its structures.   

Attributing the key role of our relationship with the U.S. in solving our problems also assumes that Cuba is collapsing and would have to grasp at straws. This perception coincides with that of those who govern the U.S. today.  

If that was the common sense that led others, richer and less dependent than us, to negotiate "an accommodation" with the superpower, we are now seeing the results of that pragmatism.  

I have taken, perhaps more than necessary, to review past experiences of our policies towards the U.S., aimed at dialogue, understanding and negotiation; as well as revisiting ideas about their scope and limits, in order to appreciate the main differences with the current situation. 

What is the current US position regarding dialogue, understanding, and negotiation? Which "US" are we talking about?

Are we in a cycle of his policies characterized by a search for closer ties with Latin America and the Caribbean, as happened during the Carter or Obama eras? Or is the prevailing vision that of “America for the Americans,” consisting of something more than simply recognizing their “sphere of influence”?  

Are we witnessing the rise of détente on a global scale? Or rather a return to a policy of Pax Americana, which makes no distinction even between allies and non-allies? Is this about recognizing the primacy of the US within the Western alliance? Or rather its absolute and unilateral supremacy? 

Is there any room for multilateralism in this neo-imperialist policy? 

If we are not in a moment of hemispheric dialogue or multilateral coordination, but rather of a strengthening of unilateralism, what are the conditions for expecting a negotiated solution between Cuba and the U.S.? 

None of these questions are intended to reject dialogue, much less the pursuit of understanding and the willingness to negotiate. A fundamental part of approaching it realistically and practically, of consciously acknowledging our weaknesses, and of not letting ourselves be swayed by the voices of war, lies in never forgetting for a moment with whom we are negotiating. 

I conclude by recalling a historical experience that neither Europeans nor Americans have forgotten, and which is recurrent in international studies. It is the one described by the term appeasement , defined in that context as “a policy characterized by making political, economic, and/or territorial concessions to an aggressor power with the supposed aim of avoiding further conflict.”

Invoking the pragmatism of maintaining peace and making concessions to avoid greater evils, the British and French governments signed the Munich Pact with Hitler, accepting the annexation of part of Czechoslovakia to Germany. Instead of appeasing him, the pact reinforced the Nazi regime's sense of impunity and emboldened it to seize all of Czechoslovakia and then invade Poland. Thus began World War II.

Remembering this lesson about the dangers of giving in to the demands of a great power would be useful not only for Cuba, but for the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean.  

Political scientist, professor, writer. Author of books and essays on the US, Cuba, society, history, and culture. He edits the magazine Temas.