Cuba and the U.S.: Memo on dialogue, understanding and negotiation
Continuing to associate reforms and their implementation with the “pragmatic” management of relations with the U.S. not only ignores the causes of the deterioration of relations, but also confuses the terms of our problems.
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The ways in which these three “expertises” are exercised, however, tend to differ markedly. As prima facie evidence , one need only look at how many polarized opinions and bitter debates circulate on social media about baseball and hurricanes, compared to all that is said, proposed, predicted, and cursed about the relationship between our two countries.
Having dedicated a longer part of my life to researching them than I should have, and having been wrong many times, I am still fascinated by the way they are discussed, especially because of their frequent assertiveness and subjectivity.
Indeed, few issues stir up as much frustration, expectation, and “definitive solutions” as this one. Even among those who repeatedly claim that the blockade isn't the root of all our problems, many behave as if “normal relations” could resolve almost everything. Whether the island becomes that kind of imagined promised land—prosperous, sustainable, and democratic, a place no one wants to leave—seems to depend on our relationship with them.
And although their policies remind us time and again of the imperialist nature that continues to govern them, we dream of a future in which we can experience our proximity as good neighborliness and a shared cultural legacy, instead of in an adverse and predominant geopolitical condition.
This subjectivization of relationships also tends to project the frustrations and disagreements of many with the Cuban government, which are in themselves quite understandable, to attribute to it the cause of the impasse, the setbacks or aggravations they experience.
As if it were a condition made chronic by ineptitude in treating it, instead of a configuration of asymmetrical powers, whose cycles of polarization and approximation have been determined by the great power, as can be verified by a simple inspection of history.
Lately, I have tried to explore the picture of these relationships by resorting to the classic triangle US-Latin America+Caribbean-Cuba, looking in it for explanations about what is happening or could happen in its dynamics, as an alternative to the subjectivist approach.
Under the shocking effect of the Venezuelan crisis, and the cloud of rushed speeches and moralizing that accompanied it, I tried to examine the fundamental differences between the Venezuelan scenario and our own, and appreciate the limits to a military escalation against Cuba, without underestimating the dangers and real costs posed by the increased aggression of the U.S.
I would like to go back a little further now and revisit the last phase of rapprochement we had. This is not only because the mutual interests that fostered it remain, but also because, particularly on the Cuban side, some of the actors who participated in that understanding are still alive.
And, above all, to learn from the stark differences between these two circumstances. This is something that must be carefully considered in politics, since not everything depends on the good or ill will of the parties involved, even though voluntarism is a characteristic of our political culture—that of both sides. It's not always, in fact almost never, that "where there's a will, there's a way."
Just 12 years ago, the Cuban and U.S. governments negotiated and agreed to nothing less than the normalization of diplomatic relations. They reached that point thanks to a long and complicated dialogue on prisoner exchanges, which was possible because there was a limited time to achieve such an agreement on the U.S. side.
Indeed, if Alan Gross had died of a heart attack in a Cuban prison, the Obama administration would have paid a very high political price. Therefore, the urgency of reaching an agreement within a specific timeframe outweighed the asymmetry of power and interests between the two sides.
I suppose I don't need to demonstrate that the initiative for this rapprochement came from the US, since Cuba's receptive attitude toward negotiation and its willingness to "talk about any subject" had been present since Raúl Castro assumed the presidency (2008). Although Obama had announced a change in policy toward Cuba during his election campaign (2008) and had later promised it to the countries of the region (2009), it had not yet materialized, apart from some minor adjustments.
By the end of 2014, however, this initiative had the advantage of being relatively inexpensive to implement. Favorable factors included the fact that the final two years of the presidential term were approaching; that the majority of U.S. public opinion favored an agreement; and that a growing number of Cuban emigrants had endorsed a détente agenda that would facilitate travel and remittances.
On the international stage, all the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean, and also the European allies, regardless of their ideological positions, thought the same.
The only obstacle was the lobby of hardline Cuban Americans in South Florida. But it wasn't the first time the U.S. government had overruled that lobby when it came to a matter that truly mattered.
Even with this favorable situation, Pope Francis's mediation was necessary to break the deadlock and facilitate the dialogue that led to the prisoner exchange. That dialogue, and the resulting agreement, served as a springboard for something unexpected: the restoration of diplomatic relations, known as "normalization." Why?
Obama never promised to normalize relations. It would have provoked opposition in Congress, within sectors of the bureaucracy itself, as well as from all the operators and stakeholders in the anti-Castro industry, especially in South Florida.
We can admit that he had that secret intention; but we know that secret intentions or what they would have liked to do does not always lead to actions that are convenient for politicians.
The fact is that, beyond those inclinations and conveniences, it could be estimated with certainty that the release and exchange of prisoners, once it was a fait accompli , was going to awaken that same reaction and generate a fixed, predictable political cost.
To put it in terms of marginalist cost-benefit theory: to what extent was the normalization—that is, the elevation to embassy status of the interests sections in Havana and Washington, existing since 1977—going to generate a superlative marginal cost? And it turned out to be minimal.
In addition to having the support of all the actors and favorable currents mentioned above, including the silent majority of emigration, the Obama administration could then afford to invest its remaining political capital in a small business like the Cuba issue, make it flourish over the next 25 months, and turn it into an important topic of its legacy.
To achieve this, he relied on the cooperation of the Cuban government, which did not demand the lifting of the embargo as a precondition for declaring normalization. Speaking of concessions, none of those that made the rapprochement and progress in relations possible in 2015-2016 can compare to this one.
It goes without saying that economic interests were not the driving force behind this policy on the US side. But the national security interests shared by both sides were not insignificant. A review of the 23 agreements reached before Obama left the White House confirms this.
What happened on the Cuban side, and what costs had to be paid? As might be expected, the vast majority of Cubans overwhelmingly supported normalization. Many celebrated it as a triumph of national sovereignty. They anticipated that, even without the lifting of the embargo, it was a step in that direction, and they began to reap the direct benefits of détente: the increase in visits from Americans and Cuban-Americans, greater flexibility in visa issuance, commercial flights between various U.S. cities and Cuban provinces, the surge in licenses for cultural and academic exchanges, and so on. Various groups of Cubans took advantage of these advances, in addition to all that was achieved in terms of cooperation between the two governments.
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The main cost, in my opinion, was precisely in the link that was created, subjectively, between the progress of the reform program, approved three years earlier, and the process of normalization in bilateral relations.
Undoubtedly, the expectation of improved relations became an objective factor, catapulting Cuba's foreign relations and expanding them beyond the U.S. During the two years of normalization, more dignitaries and high-level government representatives from around the world visited the island than ever before—by my count, an average of two per week.
If those expectations were not met, it wasn't precisely due to a lack of pragmatism in Cuban politics, the predominance of a conservative style that paralyzed ongoing changes, closed off the space and legitimacy of the private sector, or responded to a besieged fortress mentality. Rather, it was due to the shift in US policy, especially since the summer of 2017, when the "sonic attacks" literally paralyzed compliance with migration agreements, the main axis of understanding and cooperation between the two sides since 1995.
Continuing to associate reforms and their implementation with the “pragmatic” management of relations with the U.S. not only ignores the causes of the deterioration of relations, but also confuses the terms of our problems.
Should continuing to support the private and cooperative sectors; guaranteeing the expression of public opinion and the real autonomy of the media; the place of emigrants and their citizenship status; and continuing to produce legislation that empowers municipalities, recognizes associations, human rights, etc., as provided for in the Constitution, be made viable to become a negotiable agenda with the US?
Defending reforms in the realm of domestic policy as essential to fostering socioeconomic development, making social services sustainable, increasing and distributing well-being, citizen participation and control, as well as strengthening autonomy in foreign relations, facilitating alliances, and diversifying dependencies, gives the reforms a meaning that forms part of Cuba's international projection. But there is a long way to go from there to creating a framework that gives them meaning as a bargaining chip in international negotiations.
It is important to remember that the purpose of reforms in a socialist policy is to engage with, foster, and legitimize consensus. Otherwise, it becomes merely a technocratic exercise or a simple adaptation to the international order and its structures.
Attributing the key role of our relationship with the U.S. in solving our problems also assumes that Cuba is collapsing and would have to grasp at straws. This perception coincides with that of those who govern the U.S. today.
If that was the common sense that led others, richer and less dependent than us, to negotiate "an accommodation" with the superpower, we are now seeing the results of that pragmatism.
I have taken, perhaps more than necessary, to review past experiences of our policies towards the U.S., aimed at dialogue, understanding and negotiation; as well as revisiting ideas about their scope and limits, in order to appreciate the main differences with the current situation.
What is the current US position regarding dialogue, understanding, and negotiation? Which "US" are we talking about?
Are we in a cycle of his policies characterized by a search for closer ties with Latin America and the Caribbean, as happened during the Carter or Obama eras? Or is the prevailing vision that of “America for the Americans,” consisting of something more than simply recognizing their “sphere of influence”?
Are we witnessing the rise of détente on a global scale? Or rather a return to a policy of Pax Americana, which makes no distinction even between allies and non-allies? Is this about recognizing the primacy of the US within the Western alliance? Or rather its absolute and unilateral supremacy?
Is there any room for multilateralism in this neo-imperialist policy?
If we are not in a moment of hemispheric dialogue or multilateral coordination, but rather of a strengthening of unilateralism, what are the conditions for expecting a negotiated solution between Cuba and the U.S.?
None of these questions are intended to reject dialogue, much less the pursuit of understanding and the willingness to negotiate. A fundamental part of approaching it realistically and practically, of consciously acknowledging our weaknesses, and of not letting ourselves be swayed by the voices of war, lies in never forgetting for a moment with whom we are negotiating.
I conclude by recalling a historical experience that neither Europeans nor Americans have forgotten, and which is recurrent in international studies. It is the one described by the term appeasement , defined in that context as “a policy characterized by making political, economic, and/or territorial concessions to an aggressor power with the supposed aim of avoiding further conflict.”
Invoking the pragmatism of maintaining peace and making concessions to avoid greater evils, the British and French governments signed the Munich Pact with Hitler, accepting the annexation of part of Czechoslovakia to Germany. Instead of appeasing him, the pact reinforced the Nazi regime's sense of impunity and emboldened it to seize all of Czechoslovakia and then invade Poland. Thus began World War II.
Remembering this lesson about the dangers of giving in to the demands of a great power would be useful not only for Cuba, but for the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Political scientist, professor, writer. Author of books and essays on the US, Cuba, society, history, and culture. He edits the magazine Temas.
