Cuba and the US: Lessons and Counter-lessons from the Intervention in Venezuela
First of all, let's remember the saying that "there is no foreign policy like domestic policy."
To examine in an equitable manner the geopolitical situation created by the US intervention in Venezuela and its implications for Cuba requires starting by taking a step back.
First of all, let's remember the saying that "there is no foreign policy like domestic policy."
The distortion of what was happening here was the first challenge the Cuban leadership had to face. This led to the establishment of the first embassies of high-ranking officials in the United States, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where a global foreign policy and a pluralistic and autonomous network of alliances began to be forged with the emerging Global South and with various actors in the Global North. The implementation of the reform program, beginning with agrarian reform, and the recovery of national sovereignty, social justice, and development were the fundamental ingredients of the consensus and mobilization necessary to advance that revolutionary domestic and foreign policy. These ingredients allowed for the rapid creation of a national defense and security system in the face of a counterrevolution backed by the United States, which had produced a nationwide civil war and an invasion. It was the perpetuation of this conflict by the United States and the continuation of its undeclared war that prevented the internal defeat of that counterrevolution in 1961-1963 from leading to reconciliation later on. And it was their geopolitical interests that prevailed, above Cuba, the Cubans and their national interests, to continue feeding that exiled counter-revolution and refunctionalizing it in their domestic political game.
Naturally, on our side, this state of war meant that the US factor remained a constant presence in domestic politics. Consequently, the level of tension in our bilateral relations has acted as a conduit to the internal situation. Almost always to the detriment of our domestic affairs, as is to be expected.
Before discussing the extent to which our domestic/foreign policy can respond to the current challenges of the Venezuelan crisis and US interventionism, I want to return to some points that contradict “the narratives” related to the place of Cuba and Cubans in this complex geopolitical context.
This is not the first time Cuban military and security advisors have collaborated with established governments in Latin America and the Caribbean. They did so with Salvador Allende in Chile (1970-73), with the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua (1979-1990), and with Maurice Bishop in Grenada (1979-83). Of course, their influence was far less than that of civilian collaboration with these and other governments, as has also been the case in Venezuela.
Their role in security or advising those countries and governments did not involve troops deployed for military operations. However, they did have that role in the fields of health, education, and sports, providing thousands of doctors and healthcare workers, teachers, and sports and arts instructors.
Furthermore, both the civilian workers in Grenada and the small group of military personnel performing personal security duties in Venezuela found themselves caught up in a US intervention that far exceeded their mission, numbers, and available resources. The lesson of the 24 who fell in Grenada, as well as the 32 in Venezuela, is that they could have chosen not to confront a force so many times superior; and that their resistance was not merely their commitment or loyalty to the cause, nor did it stem from ideological fanaticism or suicidal tendencies; rather, it was part of a patriotic political culture, active wherever they were entrenched. There, too, they were defending their homeland.
Lest anyone think this is just a slogan, I want to emphasize that this is relevant military intelligence for a scenario of aggression against Cuba. It was the anti-lesson learned by the CIA officers who planned the Bay of Pigs invasion, as well as by the JFK administration, who were assured by newly arrived Cuban exiles that the Cuban militia and army would not fight.
Of course, we are not in the years of the October Crisis, or of the internationalist missions in Angola, or of the economic alliance and military supply with the USSR, but in the post-Cold War world, where we are left "alone with imperialism," as Kiva Maidanik said.
When that geopolitical shift occurred, there was no dialogue with Cuba. Instead, the US passed the Torricelli Act, aimed at “tightening the US embargo against Cuba and promoting democratic change on the island.” So cars in Little Havana were plastered with stickers proclaiming “Next Christmas in Havana,” and a best-selling book titled * Castro’s Final Hour * (“this time for real”) emerged as the guide to that downfall. Although no one would have paid much attention at the time, among its readers was a young man studying for his degree in Political Science at the University of Florida, named Marco Rubio. Nearly 35 years have passed since then.
One of the lessons learned from Operation Absolute Resolve is that despite its meticulous planning and the use of disproportionate force (for the objective of kidnapping a head of state), a handful of Cuban soldiers were able to fight them for two hours. The official narrative about the operation's flawless efficiency would have been untenable if even one of the infiltrations into the Venezuelan defense system had failed, or if the Cubans had received reinforcements.
Another lesson, or rather counter-lesson, is that drawing conclusions about Cuba from the Venezuelan case is risky, to say the least. Especially if one overlooks the vast differences between the two countries in terms of history, economics, society, culture, political systems, and armed forces. Assuming the US is unaware of this underestimates its level of knowledge about the real Cuba.
According to the CIA (Cuba Military 2024, CIA World Factbook), “the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are a central pillar of the Cuban regime and are considered the guardians of the revolution. The FAR are largely focused on protecting territorial integrity and the state, and perceive the United States as their main threat. The military, which once numbered over 200,000, is now estimated at around 40,000 soldiers and is a conscription-based force equipped with Soviet-era weapons and equipment.”
The CIA knows this and much more. According to Globalmilitary.net (Cuba Military Forces & Defense Capabilities), “the Cuban Army has around 50,000 active personnel and a robust reserve and paramilitary force exceeding one million, which facilitates rapid mobilization for the defense of the national territory.”
In strategic terms, according to the same source, Cuba maintains “a defensive doctrine that emphasizes territorial protection through a 'people's war' strategy based on mass mobilization… and a military posture oriented toward deterrence within geopolitical limitations.” “These efforts position Cuba to maintain a credible defense within fiscal and technological limits.”
“Cuba’s military modernization is characterized by a focused effort to upgrade Soviet-era equipment, especially air defense systems, through collaboration with Belarus and Russia. Although limited in scope due to economic and geopolitical factors, these initiatives improve Cuba’s defensive capabilities.”
In short, according to global military and security platforms, Cuba maintains effective and appropriate levels of defense for its needs, limited to deterrence and defensive resilience. The observation that this occurs “within geopolitical constraints” is not superfluous. None of these platforms—MilitarySphere.com, Globalmilitary.net, Armyrecognition.com, Globalfirepower—records anything resembling foreign military bases on the island. Despite speculation surrounding Chinese or Russian installations, which some “serious media outlets” have echoed, neither Trump nor Rubio have used this argument in their references to Cuba.
Another fundamental difference with respect to Venezuela in security matters is the cooperative relationship with the US, particularly in priority areas such as migration control and the interception of drug trafficking in the Caribbean and surrounding waters.
This cooperation has included various topics, on which progress was made not only with Democratic administrations, but also with the Republican administration between 2017 and 2020. Between 2015 and 2024, eight bilateral working groups were agreed upon to jointly address terrorism, the illicit trafficking of migrants and immigration fraud, money laundering and other financial crimes, legal assistance in criminal matters, trade security and protection of persons, human trafficking, cybersecurity and cybercrime (“Background and necessary assessments on official bilateral cooperation between Cuba and the United States, on Law Enforcement and Compliance”, December 17, 2025, presentation by the Center for International Policy Research)
Building a dossier on Cuban leadership and Cuba itself, like the one the US constructed to prepare for aggression against Venezuela, contradicts all of this. Some readers will tell me that Trump is capable of crafting a narrative that ignores these interests and this cooperation, as he has done by paralyzing it throughout 2025. Certainly. But neither he nor Rubio himself have found it logical to extend the logic of military force against Venezuela to Cuba. Despite the sensationalist interpretations that his references to Cuba have generated in some media outlets, the argument "Cuba will collapse on its own" has prevailed; because what remains for the US is to "destroy the place," an option that would not achieve what is supposedly the objective: "to bring democracy and freedom to the Cuban people." It would merely "punish the regime," with few practical results in its political aims. Because one thing is "the narrative," and another is the execution.
Here we come to another fundamental difference between Venezuela and Cuba that many overlook, and which we could define as the political economy of intervention.
What was the real objective of Operation Absolute Resolve?
The current phase of the intervention has made it even more evident that its goal was to secure that nearby oil and that its constituents are the oil corporations. The takeover of Venezuela is the most blatant and current manifestation of imperialism, as described by its scholars and theorists at the beginning of the 20th century.
According to this characterization, the US doesn't need to occupy Venezuela, nor even establish military enclaves on its territory, nor seize its oil fields and other even more strategic minerals. As Admiral Alfred T. Mahan would say in his classic texts on geopolitics, what the US needs is to administer these territories as its new possessions. And if the current rulers were to comply with this new order, it would have achieved its objective at minimal cost.
A corporate man like Trump, proud of his skills in resolving conflicts by applying his peculiar version of realpolitik, would probably be willing to "balance the books" with a Cuban leadership that was willing to give in to his interests.
If we were to momentarily consider extending to Cuba the policies devised for Venezuela, we would find some interesting results, and results that are highly contradictory to certain accepted notions about their purpose. Although we know this is a very improbable scenario, it is worth examining because of what it reveals about the consistency and nature of those policies.
The first thing that stands out in Rubio's plan for Venezuela—stabilization-recovery-transition—is that the issue of "democracy and freedom" is relegated to the background. Indeed, this formula prioritizes ensuring public order and the functioning of existing institutions, as opposed to the turbulence that an abrupt attempt at "democratizing" political change would generate.
Once that stability is secured, economic recovery would follow. As is well known, given the structural nature of many problems and their internal/external interrelationships, this recovery in Cuba could not be achieved in a few months, and in some aspects, according to most experts, it would require years. The most obvious consequence is that external capital would be essential in several sectors. But investing in an economy whose deficits begin with infrastructure (energy, water, roads, railways, etc.), a sector that would not guarantee short-term profits, cannot be solved with a magic wand. This alone should be enough to realize that the issue of recovery is more complex than it seems.
Then would come “the transition,” which would be the transformation of the political model. Although it is possible to imagine it, right now it is not clear how and to what extent the current one would be transformed. And even less clear who would be the protagonists of that change.
If Rubio's plan were to truly encourage policy towards Cuba, they should instead focus on facilitating a policy of reforms like the one the current Cuban government is obligated to implement to guide the recovery.
Instead of besieging and threatening it, it should replicate the policy George H.W. Bush pursued toward China in 1978, when he re-established relations; and the policy promoted by Republican Senator John McCain and Democrat John Kerry to re-establish relations with Vietnam (1995). These reforms did not respond to threats or external dictates, but rather emerged from changes within the communist parties themselves.
Learning from these lessons, they might also realize that the Chinese and Vietnamese diasporas did not play a leading role in generating the reforms, although they did benefit greatly from Reform and Opening Up and Doimoi. This benefit extended beyond the opportunities created for their return and active participation in the economy, encompassing education, culture, science, and, more generally, reintegration into their societies of origin, rather than continuing to oppose them and supporting the recalcitrant and isolationist policies of their historical exiles.
Thanks to the maintenance of these relations, and the continued dialogue between the US and these two governments at the highest level, their companies, universities, cultural institutions, and many government agencies, such as those for environmental protection, fighting organized crime, drug trafficking, etc., were able to coordinate and advance to the benefit of their interests.
For these reforms to succeed, a strong state was needed, capable of rebuilding a modern public sector that would promote and oversee development, guarantee welfare and basic social services, and drastically reduce poverty. Without such a strong state, it is impossible to guarantee stability or achieve the intermediate goal of recovery, on the path to a comprehensive modernization of the entire system.
The opportunities to influence these internal and external changes lie more in dialogue than in ultimatums, in cooperation than in threats. Threats can only provoke reactions in defense of sovereignty and national independence, which Cubans fiercely protect; increase the legacy of mistrust accumulated with the United States; and ultimately, damage the climate of freedom and debate necessary to advance change. This has been the typical effect of the siege fortress mentality, which should be no mystery to the United States or to anyone familiar with Cuba.
In conclusion, we return to the initial topic of these notes. What would be the purpose of domestic policy in this geopolitical situation?
Looking back on Obama's brief summer, the most complicated issue wasn't the impact of his rhetoric on civil society, the effect of his "nice guy" image on Cubans accustomed to classic imperial arrogance, or the slowness of our ideological apparatuses to adapt to the new context. The most delicate matter was the link between progress in bilateral relations and the dynamics of the ongoing reforms.
Many of the issues on the pending agenda for Cuban reforms lie in areas that overlap with the U.S. agenda toward Cuba. These include, for example, the expansion of the private sector and the incentives provided for its development; freedom of expression and the true autonomy of the media; internet access and efficiency; the status of Cuban emigrants and their citizenship rights; pending legislation on associations, the right to public protests, assembly, and religious worship; and so on. This U.S. agenda negatively impacts these issues politically.
For this reason, a coherent domestic policy—one that is neither reactive nor driven by short-term considerations—would require advancing internal and external changes that strengthen its autonomy and decouple it from the dynamics of bilateral relations. In other words, it is essential to prevent the meaning and purpose of these changes from being distorted in the eyes of the public, and, on the contrary, to reinforce the consensus necessary for their implementation, which has been weakened by years of crisis and ineffective policies. Effective communication regarding the nature of these internal changes, their scope, and political implications would also be key to contributing to a proper understanding of our foreign policy, including our policy toward the United States.
What should be done, given the circumstances created by the intervention in Venezuela and the outlook for 2026? What should be the priority policies, consistent with a strategy to overcome the crisis and address the complexity of the moment? How can we move forward, facing the challenges and strengthening consensus, without succumbing to the siege mentality?
I passed these questions on to a group of researchers of Cuban economics and politics, of varying ages and backgrounds, who live here and are active in some of our institutions. I conclude these notes with a summary of their responses, which I asked them to keep brief.
1. Reform and restructuring of the general business sector, primarily state-owned. Resizing it, expanding the powers of these companies; and introducing market mechanisms into their operation to overcome bureaucratic inertia.
2. A policy of financial and banking reform and transparency (including a new tax policy); and a proactive monetary policy that guarantees a single (economically sound) floating exchange rate for the entire economy.
3. Consolidate, expand, deepen, and revitalize trade relations with Russia and China. Activate economic and political diplomacy with other countries to secure fuel supply lines (Mexico, Russia, Iran, Algeria, Angola).
4- Stimulate exports through all possible means. Secure new agreements in other regions (Africa and eventually Asia), especially for exporting medical services.
5. Develop initiatives to resolve external debt defaults, including asset issuance, bond issuance, etc., with the aim of opening up international credit lines and encouraging greater foreign investment. Implement a more decisive opening to foreign capital and provide greater ease in conducting business, including for Cubans residing abroad, for whom an expedited process (fast track) should be established.
6. Promote food production, including sugar cane.
7. Replace the centralized economic planning for the allocation of material and financial resources inherited from the USSR. Establish the market as the regulator of the state and non-state economy. Maintain centralized state planning to determine the strategic development of the economy and to prevent market deviations that affect the population, especially the most vulnerable.
8. Convert most state-owned enterprises into publicly traded companies, which can be acquired by workers and other domestic and foreign individuals and legal entities. The management of these companies should be decided by their own workers, who would be responsible for nominating and electing the main business leaders.
9. Implement the various forms of direct democracy, where citizens make decisions on binding public matters. In the 2028 general elections, the Candidacy Commissions should nominate two candidates for each parliamentary seat, and the same procedure should be followed in the next elections for the CCP and mass and social organizations.
As some of them warn me, none of this has a technical-economic character separate from political processes that must flow and be negotiated in parallel; and that building consensus from the bottom up is key to understanding the risks that must be taken, what must be given up or sacrificed.
I would only add that, while reforms must be designed and implemented by the state, ours involve renewing a social pact, which can only be achieved openly with society. Avoiding this confrontation, for any reason or convenience , would be meaningless as a socialist policy.
https://oncubanews.com/opinion/columnas/con-todas-sus-letras/cuba-ante-eeuu-lecciones-y-antilecciones-de-la-intervencion-en-venezuela/
