Are
there peaceful solutions to the Cuban crisis?
05 January 2023
1 comments
The
depth of the current crisis
It
can be debated whether the current crisis in Cuba is more or less serious than
the crisis of the "Special Period" of the nineties, following the
fall of the Soviet Union.
In
economic terms, based on a thorough statistical comparison, Carmelo Mesa Lago
concludes that the current situation "resembles that of those terrible
years" (Mesa Lago, 2022). The fall in GDP of 10.9% in 2020 – after a
virtual stagnation during the previous five years – is the largest after the
contraction of 14.9% in 1993, the worst year of the crisis of the nineties. The
projection is that 2019 GDP – already very low – would not recover until
2024-2025. The index of industrial production in 2021 was 45.2% below the 1989
level, and food processing only reached half. The value of exports in 2021 was
67% lower than in 1989 and 63% lower than in 2013. Foreign exchange income,
counting the three main sources, fell dramatically between 2018 and 2021:
export of services (mainly health and education) with 67%; family remittances
with 71%; and tourism with 85%.
Without
up-to-date data on the depth of the current social crisis compared to the
Special Period, it is very likely that it will not be minor, and that the
income disparity is likely to be much greater.
In
political terms, it can be argued that the crisis is worse. First, the lack of
a charismatic leader like Fidel Castro, who managed, almost mysteriously, to
save the Cuban regime when most of the socialist republics collapsed, is very
clearly felt. Secondly, much of today's population has no memory of the
situation prior to 1959 or of "the achievements of the Revolution",
which probably injected a great deal of patience into the population during the
Special Period. On the contrary, today's young people have had a generally
positive experience with the relative openness of the economy and relations
with the rest of the world (including the United States), which was largely
lost. The result of this is clearly seen in the new mass exodus (mostly of
well-prepared young people) and in two hitherto unknown phenomena: open
protests, and electoral behavior despite the lack of real freedom of vote,
where abstention and voting against the official position increases.
The
sum of the economic unsustainability and political illegitimacy of the current
Cuban regime is such that Raúl Castro's metaphor of "falling off the
cliff" seems closer than ever. So the question is: what solutions can be
imagined to the crisis? In this article I limit myself to discussing solutions
to the political crisis, but the relationship and interdependence between the
political and the economic is evident.
The
New Civil Society: Politics from Below
During
the years of Raúl Castro's presidency, coinciding with the economic reforms and
the thaw in relations between the United States and Cuba (approximately
2008-2016), a new civil society emerged on the island, which had already begun
to emerge more timidly through the churches in the nineties. Perhaps the
decisive element was the gradual opening to the internet and access to smartphones,
which actually led to a weakening of the regime's monopoly of
information.
There
was a rapid expansion of social media and the emergence of independent
journalism. A myriad of alternative information agents began to appear,
promoters of peaceful political transformations. Academics and intellectuals
achieved, albeit barely, a much more autonomous space for critical debate of
alternative development options, and also found channels to convey these
thoughts to members of the system. Hoffmann (2016) states that Cuban politics
in that period underwent a great change despite the rhetoric of continuity,
which allowed the emergence of a new civil society.
Along
with the weakening of the computer monopoly, the liberalization of travel and
migration, with its transformative effect on State-citizen relations, and the
strengthening of a non-state sector, especially with the massification of
self-employed workers (self-employed), had a great impact.
In
reality, total control over citizens by the state and the Communist Party of
Cuba (PCC) was drastically reduced. What can be called "politics from
below" emerged, with actors distinct from the more traditional right-wing
dissident groups that had supported a US policy of regime change.
From
2016 and especially with the new confrontation by President Trump when he took
office in 2017, the space of this new civil society narrowed again, also for
those voices that argued for a national dialogue instead of an open
confrontation. Although the government seemed quite powerless in its efforts to
curb "virtual civil society", i.e. alternative information and debate
involving an increasing number of people, particularly the youngest, the
counter-reform that was actually consolidated with the PCC's Seventh Congress
in April 2016 seriously complicated any opportunity to initiate a dialogue on a
negotiated transformation. The PCC flatly rejected the emergence of a
counterpart with which to dialogue.
With
this counter-reform, many of the new and young actors lost all illusion of
peaceful transformations. Many of them emigrated, entrenching themselves above
all in "the second Cuba" of Florida, where they largely joined the
traditional and radical opposition.
However,
despite the new constraints, it was not possible to stop all the pro-reform
actors that had emerged in the previous era. During the discussion of a new
Cuban constitution, the churches began a harsh open campaign against the
proposal to legalize same-sex marriage, also giving rise to a counter-campaign
by the LGBTI community. When the Government realized how controversial the
provision was, the National Assembly removed it from the final version of the
new Constitution (and later reintroduced it in a new Family Code). Strong
voices of private entrepreneurs managed to limit new restrictions against their
operating space; Havana taxi drivers went on strike successfully pressuring the
authorities not to prevent their access to lower fuel prices (through the black
market); and animal rights advocates obtained a commitment from the Government
to enact an animal protection law (Decree-Law no. 31/22 "On animal
welfare").
These
and other examples have much in common: the government tried to placate
protesters rather than repress them, although protest leaders have reported
subsequent harassment by police. The state's relative tolerance of these
special interest groups contrasts sharply with the harsh preemptive repression
it generally deploys against traditional dissidents, presumably because the new
groups do not challenge the regime's basic principles and political
foundations.
That
flexibility changed with artists' protests, sparked by the so-called Decree no.
349, a new law that requires artists, musicians and performers to register with
the state, request authorization to organize events, and pay a 24% commission
on their earnings at private events. Artists feared a return to the heavy state
censorship of the seventies. The artistic community began to mobilize through
social networks.
At
first, the government was conciliatory, suspending the implementation of the
Decree and promising to modify it. But the protest movement continued to grow
and expand into new groups.
In
this situation, the San Isidro Movement (MSI) stands out, which takes its name
from the popular neighborhood of Old Havana where that group had its residence.
It is a group of dissident hip-hop artists who provoked the
government with a series of creative protests, combining their political
activism with artistic interventions. In November 2020, rapper Denis Solís, one
of the members of the group, made public through a Facebook broadcast the
moment in which he confronted a police officer, telling him that he had no
right to enter his home or harass him. Days later, Solís was arrested by
security officials, subjected to a judicial process under the charge of
contempt, which culminated in the sentence to eight months in prison and his
subsequent transfer to a maximum security penitentiary center. All this
provoked a series of protests both inside and outside the island. Other members
of the MSI began a hunger strike, which was joined by other opposition public
figures of art and culture, including journalist Carlos Manuel Álvarez. This
led by the artist and political activist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara.
Coinciding
with these events, a group of well-known Cuban musicians released the song
Patria y Vida – in allusion to the
revolutionary slogan Patria o Muerte – with lyrics that pay
homage to the MSI. Patria y Vida became the great slogan of young opponents, both in
Cuba and among Cubans abroad.
On
November 27, 2020, the arrest of fourteen MSI strikers and the interruption of
access to social networks throughout the island triggered a spontaneous
demonstration at the Ministry of Culture of some three hundred artists of
various ideologies, including some highly recognized by the government. That
group, later named the 27N Movement, even managed to get a deputy minister to
sit down for talks, promising concessions that were quickly withdrawn.
In
April 2021, residents of Havana's San Isidro neighborhood prevented the arrest
of another MSI rapper activist, Maykel Osorbo, amid anti-government slogans and
chanting the song Patria y Vida, in which Osormo himself
participates.
The
culmination of that generation of protests occurred with the spontaneous and
massive mobilization throughout the country on July 11, 2021 (11J). President
Miguel Díaz-Canel, totally shocked and apparently in great fear of losing
control of the situation, called on loyalists to take to the streets and defend
the Revolution, which provoked violent clashes with demonstrators. After two
days of protests, the police arrested about 1300 people and denied many more to
the streets. The Internet was constantly interrupted. An atmosphere of terror
was created in the population, especially among urban youth.
In
an attempt to capitalize on the 11J mobilization, a group of artists created a
Facebook group called Archipiélago, asking for permission to make new
demonstrations on November 15 (15N) of 2021. The government rejected the
petitions on the grounds that the protests were aimed at regime change, which
represented a violation of the constitutional premise that Cuba's socialist
system is "irrevocable." The government showed its strength by
stopping the announced marches, branding the organizers as foreign agents, and
arresting them. When the day came, no one else showed up at the appointed time
to leave.
The
big question, of utmost strategic importance, is what caused that 15N fiasco.
Was it the threats of the Government or the lack of support or interest among
the population? While it was a combination of those two factors, the question
about the motivation of the popular reaction cannot be avoided, between
political protest and anger over food shortages, lack of electricity, the
spread of Covid-19 and the apparent inability of the state to solve these
problems. LeoGrande (2022) considers that there is a difference of perceptions,
which "reflects the different life experiences and priorities of Cuba's
emerging young and educated middle class, on the one hand, and the working class
struggling to survive on state sector wages on the other."
In
any case, the lack of response on 15N shows that mobilization through social
networks, without clear leadership, for now is not enough to cause a popular
uprising in Cuba. Such mobilization may provoke a protest, but it
is difficult to provide a response on its own to the crisis.
That is why it is necessary to build the conditions for dialogue.
The
repression that followed 11J and 15N was massive. This was documented by
the HRW Report published on the anniversary
of 11J in 2022, which bears witness to a wide range of human rights violations
committed in the context of the protests, including arbitrary detentions, and
prosecutions plagued by abuse and torture. The government's crackdown and
apparent unwillingness to address the underlying issues that brought Cubans
onto the streets, including limited access to food and medicine, have led to a
human rights crisis. The number of political prisoners reaches almost 1000
people, some with sentences of up to 25 years.
The
number of people leaving the country increased dramatically. It is estimated
that during the year 2022, the number of Cuban immigrants to the United States
exceeded 200 thousand, the highest annual number of Cuban immigrants entering
the northern neighbor (Mesa Lago, 2022).
Most
of the MSI activists and others who played a prominent role on 11J are already
among the political prisoners, while others managed to travel abroad. With the
mass incarceration of activists, and the historically large exodus of young
people with academic training and organizational skills, the government seemed
to have pacified the country. The control of the streets is not total, but the
spontaneous protests against the blackouts at the end of September 2022 were
quickly controlled with a widespread internet shutdown and the deployment and
patrolling of police and military vehicles.
Once
again, as so often in the history of the Revolution, the opposition has gone
into exile. The exit won the voice, in terms of
Hirschman (1970). Therefore, it is from exile that they organize again, with
three main demands: release of political prisoners, response to the humanitarian
crisis and a dialogue to democratize the country.
To
the reactions of protest and exodus must be added a third response of the
population to the current crisis of legitimacy: electoral behavior.
Historically, and as a clear reflection of the authoritarian system, the vast
majority have voted in favor of the will of the single party and the
government. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, only 3% of voters abstained.
In 2018, that percentage rose to almost 15%, and in the November 2022 municipal
elections to 31%, plus 11% of white and voided votes. In the referendum on the
Constitution in 1976, almost 98% voted in favour. When the new Constitution was
put to a referendum in 2019, the comparative figure was 22% (adding 10%
abstention, 8% NO, and 4% white and annulled votes). In September 2022, there
was a historic event in the electoral behavior of the Cuban Revolution:
although the new Family Code was approved by 67% of positive votes in another
referendum, adding 33% of votes against with the abstention of 26% plus null or
annulled votes, the law was approved by only 46.70% of the Cuban population
with the right to vote.
The
need for two parallel dialogues
The
Cuban crisis cries out for two parallel dialogues: between the Cuban government
and its own population, and between the governments of Havana and Washington.
The first is vital to restore a minimum of trust and legitimacy between rulers
and governed, and to put on the table the indisputably legitimate claims of the
population, both economic and political. The latter represents the only way out
of the Cuban economic crisis. But the question is whether there is anyone who
wants to dialogue, what would be the agenda, and above all what could be the
process to reach the two dialogue tables. The resistance of all three sides so
far has hampered that whole process.
The
role of the Cuban government
Despite
facing what is possibly the deepest crisis in the history of the Revolution, at
the moment there does not seem to be the slightest political will to
recognize and sit down with representatives of the population who are not from
their own political apparatus. The question is how far the situation will have
to worsen for the government to be willing to talk.
There
are two factors that may have an impact on ending this intransigence. The first
is the fact that the Latin American left is moving decisively towards
democratic positions and against authoritarianism. With elections in Chile,
Colombia and Brazil during 2022, Cuba finds itself increasingly politically
distant from the new leftist wave in the region, in authoritarian company only
from Venezuela and Nicaragua. If an agreement is also reached between the
government and the opposition in Venezuela, it will be even more difficult for
Cuba to maintain the rejection of an opening. Nor would it have much to expect
from the current situation that countries such as Russia and China are going
through. In this circumstance, an initiative of the governments, parties and
leftist leaders of Latin America, old allies of Cuba, should be able to have
some impact in favor of a relaxation of positions in Havana. Trade unionists
should join in this initiative, inviting the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba
(CTC) to collaborate with the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA).
The
probably most attractive incentive for Havana to be more flexible would be a
process toward normalization in relations with the United States. The official
Cuban position states that any issue can be negotiated, as long as there is no
foreign interference in Cuban internal affairs. In reality, everyone knows that
the hard American position, which until recently did not change much between
the Trump and Biden administrations, would only begin to soften if there are
reforms in Cuba. The problem is how to draw a parallel between changes in
Havana and changes in U.S. policy.
The
role of the United States
What
at the end of the day would allow a change in the policy towards Cuba is that
significant changes can be seen on the island economically, but above all
politically. It is a mirror situation to the one we find in Havana: changes in
Cuba depend on changes in U.S. policy. The question is who moves first, or
better: how to achieve a parallel dynamic?
There
is a new factor now: U.S. policy toward Cuba has always been characterized as
an aspect of domestic politics, specifically it has been part of the electoral
battle for Florida as a swing state, where Cuban-Americans have a
tremendously strong lobby. For the Democrats, it has always been
considered essential to win Florida, and adjust "Cuban politics" to
what gives more votes. With the last midterm election in November 2022, Florida
can already be considered lost by Democrats in the immediate future. According
to William LeoGrande (2022): for the first time in many decades, the Democrats
can stop formulating their policy towards Cuba as a domestic policy issue, that
is, win Florida.
A
second factor is the relevance of the new leftist wave in Latin America. It can
already be considered as important for the Biden administration, as it was for
Obama, to change the hostile policy towards Cuba to look good with Latin
American governments that demand the end of the embargo. The messages from the
region's leaders are equally clear now. The recent appointment of former
Senator Christopher Dodd — a historical critic of the aggressive U.S.
confrontation with the left in Latin America — as special adviser to the
president for the Americas may be a first step in that direction.
It
is perhaps for this reason that we have recently noticed very careful signs of
rapprochement between Cuba and the United States: the two-million-dollar
humanitarian aid that the United States granted to Cuba in the wake of
Hurricane Ian; the recent negotiation for an arrangement to normalize migration
relations and remittances; and the near-finalized U.S.-Venezuela agreement that
may depend on active Cuban support to deliver results.
If
those factors can be considered positive for a return to the Cuban politics
that characterized the Obama administration, there is an elephant in
the room: Bob Menendez, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee, a committee that also includes Cuban-Americans Marco Rubio and Ted
Cruz. Menendez shares radical positions against the Cuban government with these
and other Republicans and, at the same time, is a politician who has very close
relations with Biden, who cannot risk a confrontation with Menendez. That is
why it will be important for him to be part of any arrangement with Cuba.
The
emergence of a new civil society calling for dialogue
So
far it has not been only the two governments that have opposed dialogue. The
position of the great part of the Cuban opposition, both internally and abroad,
has been one of rejection of any negotiation with a regime considered
dictatorial and illegitimate. Actors who for several years have argued for
dialogue have found little support.
Going
up and down a roller coaster for the last ten years and ending up as victims of
unprecedented repression in Cuba, a new civil society willing to dialogue
focused on solutions, mainly organized through the diaspora, is already
repositioned. Almost under the radar, they resurrect a series of initiatives,
and perhaps a minimum common platform, in the process of taking shape as an
expression with political legitimacy.
In
September 2022, the formation of the D Frente platform was
announced, "a democratic front of concertation of plural Cuban civil and
political actors, whose central objective is to achieve the refoundation of the
Republic, guided by Marti's idea of building a country with all and for
the good of all."
Since
its foundation, there are a number of member organizations, representing three
different dimensions of Cuban society:
As
an expression of the new actors of open protest, there is the San
Isidro Movement, with members of the group who managed to go abroad,
representing their imprisoned comrades. Within the same group can be included
the Association of mothers and relatives of political prisoners for
Amnesty, which represents around 1000 political prisoners in the wake of
11J and the following repressive acts. We also find among the founders the
Archipelago group, the network of cultural actors that was born with the
massive action in the Ministry of Culture on November 27, 2020.
There
is a presence of the most traditional dissidents, through the
Council for the Democratic Transition in Cuba (CTDC), a space founded in 2021
by opponents and activists of different political tendencies. The coordinator
is José Daniel Ferrer, the imprisoned leader of the Patriotic Union, according
to the US State Department "the largest group of the Cuban
opposition" (which also considers Ferrer "the visible head of the
dissident movement").
Behind
these groups, constantly working to promote peaceful dialogue, is the
group Cuba Próxima, led by Roberto Veiga, a lawyer with vast
experience working in favor of peaceful reforms and a dialogue between
government and civil society. Cuba Proxima is the latest
expression of initiatives to find new spaces while closing existing ones. That
work began with the magazine Espacio Laical, promoted by the
Archbishopric of Havana, and then continued with the organization Cuba
Posible (see Bye 2019, pp. 139-141).
What
is new with the D Frente group is exactly the coincidence
between these three traditions of the Cuban opposition. That has aroused quite
a few expectations in the unofficial press in Cuba.
It
is still necessary to give more weight to this group in Cuban society with the
integration of personalities of cultural life, who have traditionally been
considered favorable to the regime or at least not against, but who lately have
expressed themselves more critically, such as the artists Silvio Rodríguez and
Leonardo Padura.
How
to trigger a series of events that can bring the three parties closer together
in the two parallel dialogues we have talked about?
I
share some ideas to promote that dynamic of dialogues that can unblock the
apparent total impasse existing in Cuba.
There
are two immediate challenges for Cuban society that require an immediate
response, which in turn can trigger a constructive dynamic: to alleviate the
crisis of popular survival, a major humanitarian corridor must be
established. At the same time, the political crisis will not be
resolved without starting with the release of political prisoners.
The three parties (civil society + U.S. and Cuban governments) would have to
find a mutually acceptable methodology to attack those two immediate crises.
The
humanitarian corridor, in order to have legitimacy both in the population and
in the international community, cannot be an exclusive responsibility of the
Cuban government. It should take as a starting point the already existing
small-scale efforts of civil society (the Spain-Cuba, Miami-Cuba corridors,
etc.), which are already being established with the networks of relatives in
Cuba. Consideration should be given to expanding that through an international
humanitarian mechanism, and a wider network of family members with relatives
abroad. Perhaps mechanisms can be explored to socialize
remittances, to generate support beyond each beneficiary family and
benefit the community where it resides. Obviously there has to be an
understanding between the international actor and the government, but
maintaining some distance with government structures and rather channeling aid
through local communities and family networks. If such a mechanism can be
opened, funding must be sought from governments, including the United States.
With
such a humanitarian mechanism in place, another channel must emerge to negotiate
the release of political prisoners, starting with those who have not been
involved in acts of violence. With Cardinal Beniamino Stella's prompt visit to
Cuba, perhaps the Catholic Church and the pope himself are envisioning a role
in that regard again. Humanitarian aid must be expanded as prisoners are
released.
The
humanitarian corridor must be linked to an internal instrument: technical
assistance to non-state producers (including usufructuaries, CCS cooperatives)
and openness to market food through non-state networks (returning to the policy
of reducing the weight of Collection Centers and opening non-state wholesale
markets). An idea to consider could be the use of paladares also as popular
dining rooms. All this should lead the agricultural sector to introduce a
series of measures towards the much-needed agrarian reform, partly following
proposals already indicated in the "Guidelines" introduced at the
time by Raúl Castro, although never carried out.
By
involving networks of relatives of prisoners, relatives with relatives abroad,
non-state producers and non-state cooperatives, paladares, etc., Cuban civil
society could be expanded and legitimized, to position itself as an actor of
dialogue with the Cuban government (once the political prisoners are released).
These
proposals should seek proactive support and accompaniment among the democratic
left-wing governments of Latin America and their parties and grassroots
movements, mainly Brazil, Colombia, Chile and perhaps Mexico. Together with
other actors with a relationship of historical sympathy with Cuba (also from
the United States, Canada, the European Union and other European countries),
they must support a dialogue with the Cuban Government with the
message: "the era of authoritarianism is over, the socialism of today and
the future is democratic." These actors must present a more comprehensive
agenda of economic and political reforms (prepared by a technical team of Cuban
professionals), in parallel with a normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations
(prepared by diplomats from the two countries). The first step in that regard
should be to remove Cuba from the list of terrorist countries.
You
have to realize that time is short: the window of opportunity may close in
November 2024, with the US presidential election and the possible return of a
far-right Republican president. If the European Union is to be involved, the
window may be open only until the possible summit between the EU and CELAC
(Route, 2023), supposedly under the Spanish presidency of the EU, which begins
in July 2023, and before the general elections in Spain, scheduled for October
next year.
Conclusion
If
one adds up the economic and political factors, the Cuban nation is going
through what can easily be considered the worst crisis after the 1959
Revolution. The need to seek the two parallel dialogues, between the Cuban
government and its own population, and between the governments of Cuba and the
United States, seems more obvious than ever. Without one, there will be no
other. All three sides need to demonstrate flexibility and pragmatism, which
surely requires external facilitation, especially from other Latin American
governments and leaders. Similarly, there is an interdependence between
economic and political issues to be addressed in the two dialogues. In this
article the political part has been discussed. On the economic side, Mesa
Lago's conclusion in the cited article is equally clear: "I urge an open,
respectful and democratic national dialogue so that the population discusses
the change to the model of market socialism."
There
should be a window of opportunity to initiate a dialogue process. It is very
likely that this window will not stay open for long. Someone has to facilitate
the first steps, without further delay.
References
Bye,
Vegard: Cuba, from Fidel to Raúl and Beyond. Palgrave
MacMillan, London, 2019.
Hirschman,
Alberto O.: Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
Hoffmann,
Bert: «Bureaucratic Socialism in Reform Mode: The Changing Politics of Cubas
Post-Fidel Era», in: International Political Science Review 30 (3,
June), 2016, pp. 229-248.
LeoGrande,
William (2022): «Why Democrats Should Forget About
Winning Florida», in: Foreign Policy, 21.11.2022: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/21/democrats-florida-republicans-cuban-american-cuba-trump-biden-obama/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921
Mesa
Lago, Carmelo: «Cuba's economy in times of crisis: 2020-2022 and perspectives
for 2023», in: La Joven Cuba (to appear), 2022.
Human
Rights Watch, July 11, 2022: https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/07/11/prison-or-exile/cubas-systematic-repression-july-2021-demonstrators
According
to non-governmental sources, a total of 1771 arrests for political reasons have
been recorded; 758 remain in prison; 706 have been tried; 963 people imprisoned
and sentenced or awaiting trial: https://www.justicia11j.org the website of the
group Justicia 11J, which works on documentation on prisoners with the NGO
Cubalex.
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-63097483
National
Electoral Council. www.eleccionesencuba.cu. Retrieved
September 27, 2022.
The
boycott by a number of presidents of the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles
in June 2022, and the message to Secretary of State Blinken when he visited the
region in October of the same year: https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-10-12/us-has-tough-sell-in-latin-america-blinken
https://www.cubaproxima.org/post/d-frente-por-cuba
https://www.cubaproxima.org/
https://www.14ymedio.com/cuba/organizaciones-oposicion-cubana-refundar-Republica_0_3383061664.html
https://www.14ymedio.com/cuba/organizaciones-oposicion-cubana-refundar-Republica_0_3383061664.html
https://www.14ymedio.com/blogs/desde_aqui/Frente-nuevo-esfuerzo-encontrar-soluciones_7_3383131655.html
https://www.14ymedio.com/cuba/plataforma-Frente-mediacion-Papa-politicos_0_3436456327.html
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-63097483
https://cubaproxima.org/hay-soluciones-pacificas-a-la-crisis-cubana/
