Tuesday, July 8, 2025

Contrary Views of Cuba's Communist Party

The Communist Party shows no signs of life

byHarold Cardenas Lema

July 8, 2025


Judging by the press reports on the 10th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) seems to live more in another country than in the Cuba of 2025. While citizen unrest increases and material conditions deteriorate, the country's highest political authorities are meeting without live broadcasts of their debates, in a concert of unanimous opinions and without exhibiting a sufficient sense of urgency. Rather than being a forum for deliberation, the Plenary Session seems more like a symbolic reaffirmation than a tool for agreeing on public policies in an increasingly adverse environment.

The 10th Plenary Session of the PCC Central Committee, held on July 4 and 5, was an opportunity for its leadership to frankly acknowledge the magnitude of the crisis. It failed to do so. Despite the economic collapse, widespread social unrest, and the loss of confidence in the official discourse, the Party—while superficially acknowledging some of these problems—continues to complacently look inward, locked into its own formulas, lacking sufficient self-criticism or will for structural change.

However, there is still time. Instead of persisting in its isolation, the Party could choose another path: engaging in real politics. Recovering its vocation to represent, engage in dialogue, and persuade. But at this critical moment, what is impossible to ignore is that it has chosen not to do so. To top it all off, it continues to insist on a discourse that divides Cubans into patriots and enemies, without demonstrating any ability or interest in governing for all Cubans. That is the image its critics have historically sought to portray, and which the Party now willingly reinforces.

For decades, the Party maintained its authority in a peculiar balance: it was neither truly democratic nor illegitimate. Part of its legitimacy stemmed from tangible achievements in health, education, and equality, but also from its outright opposition to an external enemy with little moral standing in the region: the United States.

The Party maintained its authority in a peculiar balance: it was not truly democratic, but neither was it illegitimate.

Over time, that narrative changed. The Special Period marked a profound fracture; even so, several of these guarantees remained. But after Fidel Castro's departure, first due to illness and then death, the Party was left without its central figure. Since then, the gap between official discourse and everyday life has become undeniable.

Today, fewer and fewer Cubans believe in the revolutionary epic. The Party no longer represents a promise of the future. In fact, quite the opposite; for many, it is now an obstacle to achieving it. And this discredit is not only a product of the blockade and the international context: it is the direct consequence of a series of clumsy decisions, a failure to listen, and a systematic denial of the signs of wear and tear.

The most radical political transformation in Cuba has not occurred in the structures of the state, but in the thinking of its people. Exhaustion, frustration, and mass emigration are symptoms of a rupture already in progress.

The Party has lost its monopoly on hope. Its narrative no longer defines the present, much less the future. And the most serious thing is that it doesn't seem to be aware of this. Heir to a political culture that punishes internal criticism, it has fallen into a dynamic of institutional self-deception, where problems are camouflaged with euphemisms and the solution is always "on the way."

The situation is so dire that, in certain areas of the country, the state has retreated to the point that churches and religious communities, previously marginalized or under surveillance, fill the void by listening, assisting, and providing meaning. These institutions, in many cases, even maintain conservative agendas that run counter to the idea of ​​progress and social rights that have traditionally permeated the Cuban revolutionary ideology. Where the Party no longer reaches, other actors are taking its place, offering what the political system can no longer provide: a paradigm of life and the resources to achieve it.

The fact that the Party has lost legitimacy doesn't mean the opposition is ready, united, or deserving of replacing it. Most dissident actors still lack a clear strategy. And they often give the impression of preferring collapse to building viable alternatives.

Government repression isn't necessarily the main reason for the opposition's weakness. There is inertia among the forces opposed to the PCC. Inside Cuba, the opposition needs the desperation of citizens to grow its ranks. Outside, the most visible exile community continues to be dominated by a political class with dubious democratic credentials and a long history of aligning itself with authoritarian agendas and disrespecting national sovereignty.

Government repression isn't necessarily the main reason for the opposition's weakness. There is inertia among the forces opposed to the CCP.

Rather than a democratic project, much of the opposition offers nostalgia and revenge. And so the political vacuum grows.

In his time, Fidel Castro represented a charismatic and foundational leadership. However, almost a decade later, his absence leaves a model dependent on the leader, without leadership to sustain it.

The new generation of leaders fails to mobilize or inspire, and they delegate to repression what they cannot achieve through politics. Raúl Castro, though less charismatic, at least attempted reforms, but his legacy was trapped by the inertia of the system, the reluctance of some of his contemporaries, and international events beyond his control.

One of the faces most associated with stagnation is José Ramón Machado Ventura, who for years headed the Organization Department, and with it the Party's cadre policy. For many, his influence left an organization lacking real renewal, lacking connection to society, lacking the ability to articulate. However, a fair judgment of him is difficult; we may never know how many decisions were his own volition and how many times he was the executive arm of others.

However cynical one may be about the organization, it's necessary to mention that there is also a significant amount of sacrifice among many of its members. I prefer not to speculate about the top leadership; however, at the mid-level and grassroots, working within the party structure is a thankless vocation, sustained only by the conviction of those who do it. However, all that sacrifice is worthless if those who lead the organization don't make it even remotely competitive with other political options.

All that sacrifice is worthless if those who lead the organization do not make it moderately competitive with other political options.

The result of this plenary session is the impression of a Party exhausted and unwilling to make the necessary and urgent decisions that could save it in the eyes of its own people.

In a country where talent emigrates en masse, the PCC has the luxury of having René González—who led the last successful symbolic campaign in Cuba that spontaneously filled the country with yellow ribbons—leading an aviation club; Cristina Escobar—an ideal spokesperson for the Presidency—out of the media; a magazine like Alma Mater —which managed to capture the attention of young people like no other state-run media outlet—practically without an editorial team after the forced departure of Armando Franco; and a Ministry of Economy that, since the departure of José Luis Rodríguez, has not been led by a single expert, ignoring the constant proposals made by economists.

Time moves faster than the structures or thinking of decision-makers. Technology also threatens to leave the Party behind. VPNs are already part of digital life on the island, but satellite networks like Starlink will make current censorship mechanisms increasingly useless. On the other hand, generative artificial intelligence will be able to create fake news, simulated protests, and apocryphal speeches that generate real reactions among the population.

Time moves faster than the structures or thinking of decision-makers.

And in the near future, Artificial General Intelligence will allow us to segment moods, intervene in public discourse, and orchestrate campaigns from outside with surgical precision. For a Party without a decent communications strategy or the ability to adapt, this isn't a risk: it's a doom.

With the 10th Plenary Session just concluded, it's clear that there won't be a radical shift. But there's still room (narrow, but real) for the Party to reconnect with society. The issue goes beyond economic reforms; it's about returning to politics. It's about representing, listening, and competing.

The plenary session demonstrates the exhaustion of the current model. Today, most political parties around the world flaunt their internal differences as proof of their democratic existence. Meanwhile, the Cuban Communist Party—anchored in a false sense of strength—prefers to hide the debate and continue to represent unanimity as unity. The same images shown on state media highlighted the usual uniformly raised hands instead of a debate on the country's real problems. The contrast between this echo chamber and an increasingly diverse and outraged civil society speaks volumes. The result is a poorly staged and (badly) rehearsed spectacle, rather than a genuine deliberation.

According to the press, there was talk of "refining" the cadre policy. But reality demands transformation, not marginal adjustments. The accountability report, described as "critical and grounded in reality," was more of a collection of euphemisms. Instead of acknowledging errors, it spoke of "unwanted" rates or a "lack of integrity."

The president's closing speech was adequate by Party standards, and had it been delivered a decade ago, it might have been even bold. But in the run-up to 2025, it falls far short of what is necessary. And this is another key problem: the fact that Raúl Castro, in his time, and Díaz-Canel now, continue to be those who demonstrate the greatest critical capacity within the party leadership speaks volumes about the prevailing conservative dynamic. That no other official dares to point out the country's problems with greater acuity reveals a structure more concerned with obedience than with lucidity.

That no other official dares to point out the country's problems with greater sharpness reveals a structure more concerned with obedience than with lucidity.

In his speech, the president seemed to acknowledge the gravity of the moment, but in Cuba, power doesn't reside solely in positions. With structures like GAESA operating in parallel and the dynamics of power groups that are invisible, his scope for action is, to say the least, uncertain.

Meanwhile, daily life is becoming unbearable. The blackouts have even managed to anger activists. And the government has failed, not only in its inability to offer solutions, but also in clearly explaining, with solid arguments that don't sound like justifications, the role of US sanctions in this crisis.

The lack of empathy and self-criticism, coupled with the failure to recognize the seriousness of the situation, are also elements of counterrevolution, because they deny the founding pact of the revolutionary project: to stand with the people. And the most tragic thing is that, even if it wants to change, the Party seems to have no idea how. It doesn't know what to do differently or where to start.

Postscript

It's too late for the Party to build the society it dreamed of. The context has changed, and the people are too disillusioned. Right-wing ideas are gaining ground in hearts and minds, not because of their virtue, but because of the vacuum left by a Party that sets itself up as the vanguard of the left and has lost the drive to change what should have been changed long ago. Although the Communist Party remains in power, we already live in a post-revolutionary Cuba. Managing the changes that take place to mitigate the damage and regain some credibility would require a radically different Party than the one we saw in this plenary session.

And that is a tragedy. Many people shed their blood, and many others still sacrifice their lives today, for a revolutionary dream that is squandered in the hands of an apparatus that is no longer up to the task. History reminds us of what happened in the Soviet Union. There, it was not the people who failed, but their leaders. People, when they have a voice, are usually right.

If the Party doesn't change, history won't absolve it. It will simply stop judging it. Because it will no longer matter. Not as a power, nor as a symbol.

 https://jovencuba.com/partido-comunista-pleno/


My comment:

John McAuliff:  Where is Cuba's Vo Van Kiet and Phan Van Khai, leaders grounded in the successful defeat of the US war. who enabled Viet Nam's transformational doi moi reforms at the Sixth Party Congress in 1986.  Viet Nam took the steps to create an extraordinarily successful market economy with socialist characteristics nine years before the US ended its embargo and normalized diplomatic relations.

 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

CALL TO THE 9TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA

A Congress that will be for all the people

The conclave will meet from April 16 to 19, 2026.

Author: PCC | internet@...

July 5, 2025, 11:07:48 AM

Photo: Revolution Studios
Translation: Walter Lippmann.

 

Dear compatriots:

On October 3rd, we will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the historic day when the United Party of the Socialist Revolution adopted the name of the Communist Party of Cuba; the launch of its first Central Committee, headed by Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro Ruz; and the publication of Che's moving Farewell Letter.

Heir to the solid pillars of the patriotic program of the Cuban Revolutionary Party forged by José Martí, of the struggles for the rights of the working class and of the anti-imperialist cause of the first Communist Party of Cuba, founded almost a century ago by Carlos Baliño and Julio Antonio Mella, our Party was born from the battles waged by the people until achieving victory in January 1959 and from the revolutionary organizations that, in an exemplary and unprecedented gesture of political maturity, united in the effort to achieve definitive independence and build a just society.

With these historical motivations, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba calls for its 9th Congress to be held in 2026, the year in which we will commemorate the centennial of the birth of the historic leader of the Cuban Revolution, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, whose legacy guides the work of the Party.

This will be an opportune setting to continue updating the strategy of resistance and development, amid a multidimensional global crisis in which fascist and far-right thinking is resurfacing, with constant threats to peace; in one of the most complex and challenging circumstances in our national history, also marked by the ongoing aggressiveness of the US administration, the intensification of the genocidal economic, commercial, and financial blockade, and Cuba's inclusion on the spurious list of countries supposedly sponsoring terrorism, the consequences of which are profoundly felt in the economy and in the daily lives of Cubans.

At the last Congress, which we held in the context of confronting the pandemic and fighting to safeguard lives by creating vaccines that would protect the population, using our own resources and reserves, we proposed a development project, which we have not abandoned. Even though it has not been fully realized, the mere fact of resisting is a victory for the Cuban people.

Therefore, the 9th Congress will continue to focus its attention on finding appropriate solutions to the economic situation we face, based on the actions outlined in the Government Program to correct distortions and boost the economy.

The following are unavoidable priorities: increasing national production with an emphasis on food; ways to increase foreign currency earnings; restoring the National Electricity System; strengthening socialist state enterprises; achieving macroeconomic stability; maintaining a healthy relationship between the state and non-state sectors; reducing inflation; promoting the participation of foreign investment; and promoting efficiency and savings.

We will also continue to promote the management of science and innovation, social communication, and digital transformation for the development of our society, which has committed to further perfecting socialist and participatory democracy on the path to achieving all possible justice.

The Communist Party of Cuba, a follower of Martí, Fidelista, and Marxist-Leninist ideology, as the guiding political force of society, has the responsibility to guide the people, mobilize them to produce, develop, create, and achieve results that will, in the shortest possible time, improve the living conditions of the population, provide solid support for the social advances achieved by the Revolution, overcoming our own errors and shortcomings, and reduce the social gap that has inevitably emerged, exacerbated by the aggressive policies of imperialism in recent years.

Strengthening unity, perfecting ideological work, politically supporting the Government Program, and correcting the deviations and negative tendencies present in Cuban society are priorities in the work of the Communist Party of Cuba, the results of which we will also evaluate at the 9th Congress.

None of the above can be achieved solely through the efforts of those of us who serve within the Party. The participation of all Cubans is essential. In addition to contributing with their work, they must exercise daily and effective popular control in the defense of the Revolution's achievements.

In this context, the ideological, educational, and cultural battles take on extraordinary relevance. The Congress process will be an ideal opportunity to debate the Party's role in strengthening revolutionary values, knowledge of the nation's history, culture, and identity.

Also to discuss political, media, and community communication, essential tools for Party and government management, a defense against disinformation campaigns, manipulation, and lies orchestrated by the dominant media, and subversive plots seeking to undermine socialism.

We reaffirm, with conviction, that the defense of the Homeland and national security are strategic principles and guarantees of the nation's existence.

The Party's utmost attention is required to prevent and resolutely confront social indiscipline, crime, corruption, and illegality. Without a frontal attack on these harmful manifestations, it would be impossible to triumph in the economic battle, in preserving the morality and values that have characterized the Cuban people.

To successfully confront the enormous challenges facing Cuba today, the Party must be increasingly solid, strengthened from the grassroots to the highest levels of leadership, with an exemplary and combative membership, and more prepared cadres with analytical skills and a willingness to confront and solve problems.

The permanent connection with the people, also embodied in the systematic visits of the Party leadership to the territories, constitutes a valid working method at all levels.

It is essential to increase the active participation of all youth, with the Young Communist League, student organizations, and youth movements playing a leading role in the nation's main political and socioeconomic processes, as well as in mass and social organizations.

With unity as our essential premise, we will dedicate the Congressional debates to persisting and advancing the country's socialist transformation, with the certainty that we will not give up on building a more just and democratic society, with more rights for all.

It's worth remembering the call for unity and sincere exchange that Army General Raúl Castro Ruz made to us at the opening of the previous party meeting:

The unity of the vast majority of Cubans around the Party and the work and ideals of the Revolution has been our fundamental strategic weapon for successfully confronting all types of threats and aggression. Therefore, this unity must be zealously safeguarded.

…If we have a single Party, we must promote, in its functioning and in our society in general, the broadest democracy and a permanent, sincere and profound exchange of opinions, which are not always coincidental, strengthening ties with the working class and the population, and ensuring the growing participation of citizens in fundamental decisions.

The 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, which we will hold from April 16 to 19, 2026, will be attended by all the people. Therefore, prior to the event, we will conduct a broad consultation process on the documents to be presented, which will include members of the Party, the Union of Young Communists, political and administrative leadership structures, and mass, social, and student organizations.

It will be a worthy tribute to the history of struggle, to the ethics and spirit of independence bequeathed to us by Céspedes, Gómez, Maceo, and Martí; to the anti-imperialist thinking of Baliño, Mella, Villena, and Guiteras; to the generous dedication of Abel, Frank, Celia, Vilma, Camilo, Che, and Almeida; to the Centennial Generation and, especially, to Fidel and Raúl, leaders of the Revolution, the Party, and the people.

A few days before we remember the glorious actions of those young people who, 72 years ago, took history by storm at the walls of the Moncada and Carlos Manuel de Céspedes barracks, many of whom offered their lives so that their generous blood could pave the definitive path to freedom, we reaffirm our profound conviction in the victory of our people, who have been able to face the greatest challenges and obstacles with heroism, solidarity, and altruism.

Homeland or Death, We Will Win!

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba

https://www.granma.cu/cuba/2025-07-05/propuesta-de-convocatoria-al-9no-congreso-del-partido-comunista-de-cuba

Monday, June 30, 2025

Trump Policy Annoucement of June 30, 2025

 

Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Strengthens the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba

The White House

June 30, 2025

STRENGTHENING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD CUBA: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) to strengthen the policy of the United States toward Cuba.

  • This NSPM restores and strengthens the robust Cuba policy from the President’s first term, reversing the Biden Administration’s revocation that eased pressure on the Cuban regime.
  • The NSPM ends economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government, military, intelligence, or security agencies at the expense of the Cuban people.
    • Direct or indirect financial transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban military, such as Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), and its affiliates are prohibited, with exceptions for transactions that advance U.S. policy goals or support the Cuban people.
  • It enforces the statutory ban on U.S. tourism to Cuba and ensures compliance through regular audits and mandatory record-keeping of all travel-related transactions for at least five years.
  • The NSPM supports the economic embargo of Cuba and opposes calls in the United Nations and other international forums for its termination.
  • The NSPM amplifies efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel.
  • It ensures the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” policy remains terminated to discourage dangerous, unlawful migration.
  • The NSPM ensures that engagement between the United States and Cuba advances the interests of the United States and the Cuban people, including through promoting human rights, fostering a private sector independent of government control, and enhancing national security.
  • The NSPM mandates a review of human rights abuses in Cuba, including unlawful detentions and inhumane treatment, and requires a report on fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or being harbored by the Cuban government.

PROMOTING A STABLE, PROSPEROUS, AND FREE CUBA: President Trump is committed to fostering a free and democratic Cuba, addressing the Cuban people’s long-standing suffering under a Communist regime.

  • The Cuban people have long suffered under a Communist regime that suppresses their legitimate aspirations for freedom and prosperity, arbitrarily detains dissidents, and holds political prisoners in inhumane conditions.
  • Violence and intimidation against dissidents occur with impunity, while families of political prisoners face retaliation for their advocacy.
  • The regime harasses worshippers, blocks free association by civil society organizations, and denies free speech, including through limited internet access and the absence of a free press.
  • The Cuban government harbors fugitives of American justice and fails to meet the basic requirements of a free and just society.

HOLDING THE CUBAN REGIME ACCOUNTABLE: President Trump is continuing efforts from his first term to stand with the Cuban people and hold the regime accountable.

  • In his first term, President Trump implemented a robust policy towards Cuba, reversing the Obama Administration’s one-sided deal that eased restrictions without securing meaningful reforms for the Cuban people.
  • Now, President Trump is once again implementing a firm policy stance.
    • President Trump is fulfilling his campaign promise: “As president, I will again stand with the people of Cuba in their long quest for justice, liberty and freedom.”
  • President Trump also recently implemented a new travel ban that applies to Cuba.
    • It lists Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism and cites its failure to cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States, its historical refusal to accept back its removable nationals, and its high visa overstay rate.

 

 

·         NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM/NSPM-5

·         MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

·                        THE SECRETARY OF STATE

·                        THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

·                        THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

·                        THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

·                        THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

·                        THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

·                        THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

·                        THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

·                        THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

·                        THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY

·                        THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

·                        THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

·                           AGENCY

·                        THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

·                        THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF

·                           STAFF

·                        THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND

·                           BUDGET

·                        THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL

·                           SECURITY AFFAIRS

·                        THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND HOMELAND

·                           SECURITY ADVISOR

·                        THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

·                        THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC

·                           POLICY

·                        THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

·                        THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND

·                           TECHNOLOGY POLICY

·                        THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

·                           AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

·                        THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SMALL BUSINESS

·                           ADMINISTRATION

·                        THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR

·                           INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

·                        THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

·                           MANAGEMENT

·          

·         SUBJECT:       Reissuance of and Amendments to National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba

·              Section 1.  Purpose.  The United States recognizes the need for more freedom and democracy, improved respect for human rights, and increased free enterprise in Cuba.  The Cuban people have long suffered under a Communist regime that suppresses their legitimate aspirations for freedom and prosperity and fails to respect their essential human dignity.

·              My Administration's policy will be guided by the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, as well as solidarity with the Cuban people.  I will seek to promote a stable, prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people.  To that end, we must channel funds toward the Cuban people and away from a regime that has failed to meet the most basic requirements of a free and just society.

·              In Cuba, dissidents and peaceful protesters are arbitrarily detained and held in terrible prison conditions.  Violence and intimidation against dissidents occur with impunity.  Families of political prisoners are retaliated against for peacefully protesting the improper confinement of their loved ones.  Worshippers are harassed, and free association by civil society organizations is blocked.  The right to speak freely, including through access to the internet, is denied, and there is no free press.  The United States condemns these abuses.

·              The initial actions set forth in this memorandum, including restricting certain financial transactions and travel, encourage the Cuban government to address these abuses.  My Administration will continue to evaluate its policies so as to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba.

·          

·              Sec. 2.  Policy.  It shall be the policy of the executive branch to:

·              (a)  End economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government or its military, intelligence, or security agencies or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people.

·              (b)  Ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba.

·              (c)  Support the economic embargo of Cuba described in section 4(7) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (the embargo), including by opposing measures that call for an end to the embargo at the United Nations and other international forums and through regular reporting on whether the conditions of a transition government exist in Cuba.

·               (d)  Amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel.

·               (e)  Not reinstate the "Wet Foot, Dry Foot" policy, which encouraged untold thousands of Cuban nationals to risk their lives to travel unlawfully to the United States.

·               (f)  Ensure that engagement between the United States and Cuba advances the interests of the United States and the Cuban people.  These interests include:  advancing Cuban human rights; encouraging the growth of a Cuban private sector independent of government control; enforcing final orders of removal against Cuban nationals in the United States; protecting the national security and public health and safety of the United States, including through proper engagement on criminal cases and working to ensure the return of fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or being harbored by the Cuban government; supporting United States agriculture and protecting plant and animal health; advancing the understanding of the United States regarding scientific and environmental challenges; and facilitating safe civil aviation.

·              Sec. 3.  Implementation.  The heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall begin to implement the policy set forth in section 2 of this memorandum as follows:

·               (a)  Within 30 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate and in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, shall initiate a process to adjust current regulations regarding transactions with Cuba.

·                    (i)    As part of the regulatory changes described in this subsection, the Secretary of State shall identify any entities or subentities, as appropriate, that are under the control of, or act for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel (such as Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), its affiliates, subsidiaries, and successors), and publish a list of those identified entities and subentities with which direct or indirect financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.

·                    (ii)   Except as provided in subsection (a)(iii) of this section, the regulatory changes described in this subsection shall prohibit direct or indirect financial transactions with those entities or subentities on the list published pursuant to subsection (a)(i) of this section.

·                    (iii)  The regulatory changes described in this subsection shall not prohibit transactions that the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of State, determines are consistent with the policy set forth in section 2 of this memorandum and:

·                         (A)  concern Federal Government operations, including Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and the United States mission in Havana;

·                         (B)  support programs to build democracy in Cuba;

·                         (C)  concern air and sea operations that support permissible travel, cargo, or trade;

·                         (D)  support the acquisition of visas for permissible travel;

·                         (E)  support the expansion of direct telecommunications and internet access for the Cuban people;

·                         (F)  support the sale of agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical devices sold to Cuba consistent with the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.) and the Cuban Democracy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6001 et seq.);

·                         (G)  relate to sending, processing, or receiving authorized remittances;

·                         (H)  otherwise further the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States; or

·                         (I)  are required by law.

·               (b)  Within 30 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall initiate a process to adjust current regulations to ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba.

·                    (i)    The amended regulations shall require that educational travel be for legitimate educational purposes.  Except for educational travel that was permitted by regulation in effect on January 27, 2011, all educational travel shall be under the auspices of an organization subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and all such travelers must be accompanied by a representative of the sponsoring organization.

·                    (ii)   The regulations shall further require that those traveling for the permissible purposes of non academic education or to provide support for the Cuban people:

·                         (A)  engage in a full-time schedule of activities that enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people's independence from Cuban authorities; and

·                         (B)  meaningfully interact with individuals in Cuba.

·                    (iii)  The regulations shall continue to provide that every person engaging in travel to Cuba shall keep full and accurate records of all transactions related to authorized travel, regardless of whether they were effected pursuant to license or otherwise, and such records shall be available for examination by the Department of the Treasury for at least 5 years after the date they occur.

·                    (iv)   The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation shall review their respective agencies' enforcement of all categories of permissible travel within 90 days of the date the regulations described in this subsection are finalized to ensure such enforcement accords with the policies outlined in section 2 of this memorandum.

·               (c)  The Secretary of the Treasury shall regularly audit travel to Cuba to ensure that travelers are complying with relevant statutes and regulations.  The Secretary of the Treasury shall request that the Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury inspect the actions taken by the Department of the Treasury to implement this audit requirement.  The Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury shall provide a report to the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury, summarizing the results of that inspection within 180 days of the adjustment of current regulations described in subsection (b) of this section and annually thereafter.

·               (d)  The Secretary of the Treasury shall adjust the Department of the Treasury's current regulation defining the term "prohibited officials of the Government of Cuba" so that, for purposes of title 31, part 515 of the Code of Federal Regulations, it includes Ministers and Vice-Ministers; members of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers; members and employees of the National Assembly of People's Power; members of any provincial assembly; local sector chiefs of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; Director Generals and sub-Director Generals and higher of all Cuban ministries and state agencies; employees of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT); employees of the Ministry of Defense (MINFAR); secretaries and first secretaries of the Confederation of Labor of Cuba (CTC) and its component unions; chief editors, editors, and deputy editors of Cuban state-run media organizations and programs, including newspapers, television, and radio; and members and employees of the Supreme Court (Tribuno Supremo Nacional).

·               (e)  The Secretary of State and the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations shall oppose efforts at the United Nations or (with respect to the Secretary of State) any other international forum to lift the embargo until a transition government in Cuba, as described in section 205 of the LIBERTAD Act, exists.

·               (f)  The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall provide a report to the President assessing whether and to what degree the Cuban government has satisfied the requirements of a transition government as described in section 205(a) of the LIBERTAD Act, taking into account the additional factors listed in section 205(b) of that Act.  This report shall include a review of human rights abuses committed against the Cuban people, such as unlawful detentions, arbitrary arrests, and inhumane treatment.

·               (g)  The Attorney General shall, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, issue a report to the President on issues related to fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or being harbored by the Cuban government.

·               (h)  The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall review all democracy development programs of the Federal Government in Cuba to ensure that they align with the criteria set forth in section 109(a) of the LIBERTAD Act.

·               (i)  The Secretary of State shall convene a task force, composed of relevant agencies, including the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and appropriate non-governmental organizations and private-sector entities, to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba, including through Federal Government support of programs and activities that encourage freedom of expression through independent media and internet freedom so that the Cuban people can enjoy the free and unregulated flow of information.

·               (j)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall continue to discourage dangerous, unlawful migration that puts Cuban and American lives at risk.  The Secretary of Defense shall continue to provide support, as necessary, to the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security in carrying out duties regarding interdiction of migrants.

·               (k)  The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall annually report to the President regarding the engagement of the United States with Cuba to ensure that engagement is advancing the interests of the United States.

·               (l)  All activities conducted pursuant to subsections (a) through (k) of this section shall be carried out in a manner that furthers the interests of the United States, including by appropriately protecting sensitive sources, methods, and operations of the Federal Government.

·              Sec. 4.  Earlier Presidential Actions.  (a)  This memorandum amends sections 1 and 3 of National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 of June 16, 2017 (Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba) (NSPM-5), and reissues NSPM-5 in its entirety.  It does not otherwise amend the text or timelines reflected in the original NSPM-5 and is not intended to direct agencies to repeat actions already implemented under that NSPM.

·               (b)  This memorandum supersedes and replaces both National Security Presidential Directive 52 of June 28, 2007 (U.S. Policy toward Cuba), and Presidential Policy Directive 43 of October 14, 2016 (United States-Cuba Normalization).

·               (c)  This memorandum does not affect either Executive Order 12807 of May 24, 1992 (Interdiction of Illegal Aliens), or Executive Order 13276 of November 15, 2002 (Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented Aliens Interdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region).

·              Sec. 5.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

·                    (i)  the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

·                    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

·               (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

·               (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

·               (d)  The Secretary of State is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

·          

·         DONALD J. TRUMP

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