In a few weeks, the 65th anniversary of an event that decided the fate of Cuba as an independent nation will be celebrated: Playa Girón.
The revolutionary government in power had only been in power for 28 months when the defeat of the US-sponsored invasion gave a concrete meaning to the Revolution as a defense of the homeland, even greater than agrarian reform or the nationalization of foreign companies.
Many Cubans who held divergent ideological positions and disagreed with certain policies realized that in defending that process, however it was identified, independence was at stake. Without it, none of the other changes could achieve their full meaning, nor would social justice, equitable development, or dignity as a national value be possible.
The Bay of Pigs, as they still call it, was a stunning failure for the Kennedy administration. A failure very difficult to explain, which, less than 100 days after entering the White House, weakened its credibility in domestic policy and affected its image in other regions, including Southeast Asia.
The cause of that failure was not that the members of Brigade 2506 were cowards, lacking fighting spirit, convictions, military training, or worse weaponry than that of the militias and the Rebel Army.
Nor did it happen because the counterrevolution was shattered, or had mostly settled in the U.S. instead of taking its chances here; or because it lacked organization, coordination and mobilization capacity, and a powerful fifth column made up of thousands of rebels, in addition to hundreds of thousands of Cubans who did not sympathize with socialism, and even believed that they were going to lose parental rights over their children.
A compelling parallel
The situation was ripe for imagining a resounding victory. Add to that the fact that the scheme the CIA had followed to plan the Bay of Pigs operation had been a success just seven years earlier in Guatemala.
Richard Bissel, the deputy director for Covert Operations, had selected Howard Hunt, David Atlee Phillips, and other officers who had played key roles in the coup against President Arbenz in 1954, to do the same against Fidel Castro.
There was a compelling parallel, as both countries had recently adopted nationalist policies, especially agrarian reforms. It made sense that the Bay of Pigs decision-makers were applying the lessons learned from Guatemala to the reality of Cuba in 1961.
So, while the CIA had vast intelligence networks within the island, its top leaders placed their greatest trust in those who assured that when the invaders landed, all those active and passive opponents would join their forces, as well as most of the FAR militias and troops.
It was enough to speak with the Cubans arriving in Miami and with some counterrevolutionary leaders—who were neither brutes nor mere mercenaries nor simple opportunists—to be convinced of this schism within the ranks of the Revolution itself. The situation in Cuba seemed even more favorable than that in Guatemala for a resounding victory for the invasion. Nothing could go wrong.
Fragile premises
Thanks to that peculiar intelligence; to focusing on analogies and overlooking the major differences between the two cases; to being swept away by optimism and what psychologists call groupthink ; to the lack of balance in the project put together by the CIA, ignoring the other agencies that could have provided a more realistic perspective; to the excessive confidence in the overwhelming power of the U.S.: thanks to the fragility and arrogance of those premises, and the fury and speed of the Cuban counteroffensive, the invasion was defeated in 66 hours.
The most dangerous aspect of the current scenario, in my humble opinion, is not the low fuel availability and its consequences, but rather the assumption that the system's imminent collapse is inevitable, along with the collapse of the Cuban government, which would be forced to surrender to the US and accept its terms. The validity of such calculations would be based on the recent operation against a regime and a situation that some consider very similar to Cuba's: Venezuela.
In previous articles I have tried to analyze the implications of the Venezuelan crisis for the evolution of our conflict with the US , the major differences between Cuba and Venezuela, including the relations of both countries with the North; as well as the real space for dialogue , understanding and negotiation between Cuba and the US of Donald Trump.
I want to focus here and now on the Cuban situation itself, and particularly, discuss its political and social characterization, and the premises that are assumed as accepted truths for that portrayal. Because I find some of them, shall we say, a little lacking.
Darkness and prevailing confusion
I want to make it clear that I do not underestimate the seriousness of the country's economic, social, and political situation. We are experiencing blackouts, medicine shortages, inflation, restrictions on essential services such as healthcare, education, and transportation, and gasoline shortages. While we may not objectively be facing the most critical economic situation in 60 years, as some claim, we are certainly experiencing the most prolonged crisis, one that has generated the greatest discontent and distrust in the future.
Adding to the darkness of this moment, and the prevailing ideological confusion, are the curses against the Cuban government, which many blame for everything that happens to us, as well as the cloud of premonitions that bounce around on social media, where the anticipation of the imminent collapse is replicated like a game of mirrors.
The psychological effect of the energy boycott inevitably brings us closer to a kind of apocalypse.
I do not intend, because it is not my role, to debate the characterization of the situation that saturates the media, whose underlying rumors reflect what I have just said. I respect those opinions, including those that seek to register their distance from the Cuban government at this time of decline and rising fear in the face of an unscrupulous and seemingly all-powerful policy on the other side.
These lines are not a response to any of those opinions. I am simply reflecting briefly on the premises upon which the portrait of Cuban political dynamics and its alternatives is constructed, a portrait that many of those views seem to assume.
An intelligence report
To discuss these premises, however, I am not going to fish in the tide of circulating opinions, but I have taken as "study material," as we say in our dialect, very serious strategic intelligence estimates, that is, professionals, dedicated to characterizing the situation in the midst of Trump's petro-war against Cuba.
What I quote below is a report from the intelligence and espionage company StratFor about that situation.
Regarding the meaning, scope, and real goals of the White House policy toward Cuba, Stratfor largely agrees with what I have published here.
The goal is to obtain some short-term responses from the Cuban government that can be presented as concessions—that is, victories—and used for domestic political purposes. And to achieve this at minimal cost, merely by threatening to impose tariffs on third-party goods.
Let's say that the reason for this twist is aimed at obtaining concessions, which in recent statements have been formulated as "gradually opening up their economy".
This approach does not coincide with that of some Cuban observers, who reiterate that their real goal is "regime change" in the Miami version: replacing the current government with representatives of the hardline exile community and their domestic allies.
Concessions
However, even assuming that were their “long-term” objective, for the moment, the aim is to assess a possible scenario for dialogue and negotiation, and the options for Cuba. In other words: to what extent might the current Cuban government be forced to make these concessions to avoid the US oil war?
Stratfor breaks down these concessions as follows: “The dire economic situation and the fear of military action will encourage the Cuban government to make concessions such as the release of political prisoners, cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for private sector activity and the creation of special economic zones to attract US capital.”
Although the US government could perfectly well put them on its list of “concessions wrested from the regime”, it is curious that this intelligence agency considers them possible only under the pressure of the crisis and the threat of military intervention.
Releasing prisoners has, in fact, been part of the Cuban negotiation agenda since the invasion of Brigade 2506 in the distant year of 1962, the dialogues with the Carter administration and with the émigrés (1978-79), the Obama administration (2014), and on many other occasions with US personalities and politicians.
The same as cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking since 1995, legalization (1993-1994) and the growth of the private sector since 2011, and the creation of special zones to attract foreign capital, such as Mariel (2013).
Subject to limitations and contradictions in the progress of some of these policies, it would be difficult to define them as foreign to the Cuban logic in its cooperative relations with the U.S., and to the approved reform policies.
Something not very well defined called the transition
Along the same futuristic lines, Stratfor predicts that things are not as simple as injecting US capital into Cuba. Although it doesn't mention lifting the embargo, it's clear this is a prerequisite, since it discusses the role of that capital in a new scenario, as well as other transformations needed to overcome the crisis, ensure economic stabilization, and preserve political stability, on the path toward something not very well defined called the transition.
Interestingly, however, the key role attributed to the Cuban state in achieving these goals, and the support for this role from the U.S., are noteworthy: “The slowness and social costs of Cuba’s economic opening would increase the risk of instability, making continued subsidies and U.S. intervention crucial to preventing a broader humanitarian and migration crisis. Many measures could be announced in the coming months, but not fully implemented this year, and their impact on the economy could take time to materialize. Some government subsidies will need to be maintained.”
In other words, neither the predominant weight of the free market, the multiplication of the private sector and the flow of US capital alone could dictate the architecture of that path towards a new order imagined for Cuba.
Stratfor continues, adding to this complicated situation is the fact that, due to its scale, Cuba is not as attractive to US investment, given "the size of the territory, the unskilled workforce and the generally limited economic potential."
That statement could be qualified a bit. Of course, Cuba doesn't compare to countries with large deposits of strategic minerals. However, its reserves of nickel (5.5 million tons) and cobalt (the third largest reserve in the world), essential for manufacturing lithium batteries and other electronic devices, are not insignificant.
And unlike New Caledonia, Australia, the Philippines, or the Congo, those Cuban reserves are right next to the U.S. It also has arable land to produce, say, sugar and citrus fruits, which could be open to investment from that same capital; and whose proximity to that market has previously been a proven attraction factor.
Just 90 miles away
The enduring appeal of this proximity effect was demonstrated by its ability to attract diverse national interests from around the world during Obama's brief summer, when high-ranking officials from countries that had never set foot on the island visited with unprecedented frequency. Many of them were drawn not so much by Cuba's limited domestic market, but rather by the proximity to the U.S. market that seemed to be emerging on the horizon.
I am not going to discuss here whether Cuba lacks a skilled workforce to deal with the business world, as some foreign businessmen I have spoken with believe, who are willing to educate Cuban entrepreneurs.
It's worth remembering that if the large proportion of professionals in the migratory flow—an impression many of us share, though experts on social media haven't been able to investigate it—is a deficit that hinders development, it's because they have graduated in science and technology, medicine, social sciences, and humanities from universities across the country, not just in Havana. Many of them would be a skilled workforce for research, development, and production in electronics, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and other cutting-edge sectors.
One of those sectors, which I will only briefly touch upon before concluding, is energy transition. Stratfor states: “Developing solar and wind energy projects to reduce Cuba’s dependence on fuel imports for electricity generation would take years or even decades.”
Cuban engineers and scientists dedicated to the subject do not agree with this assessment.
They, and institutions like Cubasolar , have been dedicated to promoting this conversion for decades, demonstrating that the end of dependence on fossil fuels and the move towards self-sufficiency in renewable sources is not only possible but essential.
This vision has been so influential in shaping policies that the 2030 Development Plan predicted that 37% of all demand would be supplied by biogas (15%), photovoltaic panels (12%), wind farms (9%) and hydropower (1%).
Of course, authorizing private entrepreneurs to import fuels is a step forward in their integration into the economic system. But continuing to depend on fossil fuels, regardless of who the importer is, perpetuates the pattern of dependency and postpones a fundamental shift in the energy matrix adopted at least 12 years ago, a shift that, according to that Development Plan , should have led us to supply more than a third of our consumption with renewable sources within four years. Can you imagine how different life would be if we only needed to import a third or less of the oil to supply our aging thermal power plants?
Allies
“The Cuban government has weakened, as evidenced by its isolation from traditional allies,” StratFor states. Given that Cuba’s main allies, aside from the declining presence of Venezuela, have been and continue to be China, Russia, and Vietnam, and that its trading partners include these same countries, as well as Spain and Canada, this reference to its isolation seems enigmatic.
In any case, it's obvious that those allies are still there—although none of them are the former USSR. If we understand that these alliances have a different nature than those that existed during the socialist era, perhaps we can realize that not only can we not expect the same from them, but Cuba doesn't mean the same thing to them either.
While the issue of relations with “traditional allies” would require a more in-depth and documented analysis than that offered by StratFor, the idea that they are interested in supporting Cuba based on ideological affinities is insufficient to explain them. Nor is it enough to assume that Cuba is a kind of “disabled ally,” politically speaking. Furthermore, it serves as a test case for gauging their capacity to respond to the United States.
Indeed, China and Russia have their own reasons for reacting to Trump's threats. In the same decree where he proclaims a war against the island, he cites its alliances with Russia, China, and Iran as the primary evidence that it poses a threat to the US, thereby declaring them directly as dangerous outsiders in a hemisphere where they supposedly should require US permission to operate.
Solidarity with Cuba
I said earlier that I didn't know if the fuel shortage was worse than the image of Armageddon. However, I must acknowledge that the brutal US action, adding another twist to the already established blockade, has had the merit of awakening solidarity with Cuba, not only among governments like Mexico's, and among old friends of the Cuban Revolution.
These days, I've received more messages than ever before from strangers asking how they can help us, including some who have no affinity for the Cuban government. As I once heard Cintio Vitier say, taking this side isn't an ideological choice, but a matter of decency.
I want to conclude by emphasizing this point about decency. Of course, among our weaknesses is not having made enough progress on the agreed-upon policies, which has made us more vulnerable to the attacks of an indecent enemy, like the one we have been dealt.
The case of oil dependency, in contradiction with our own energy development plan based on renewable sources, is a prime example. However, we must not confuse this self-criticism with adopting a neutral stance in this escalating tension with the nation's main enemy.
Some Cubans, both here and abroad, seem to believe that the key to managing this surge with clarity and composure lies in something called national reconciliation. As someone who has worked to understand the Cuban diaspora and the factors that shape it, its interactions with Cuba and with the power structures and system on the other side, and who has tried to contribute to dialogue and policy changes here, I don't believe that connection will be effective; quite the contrary.
The instruments of torture and the accelerator of collapse
The latest argument for considering the scenario of imminent collapse of the system, not because "it falls off its own feet" nor because military force would serve to precipitate it ("the only thing left would be to go in and destroy everything," Trump said), but thanks to the oil boycott , has just been brought about by the Supreme Court ruling declaring illegal the imposition of tariffs by the Executive without consulting anyone.
The truth is that Cuba is nowhere to be found in the Supreme Court ruling. It is more of a restriction on the sweeping use of presidential powers, which Trump has employed as a political style, applying it to many, including US allies, through extreme threats such as territorial annexation—threats he has not used against Cuba—and whose true purpose has been to obtain favors or concessions.
If Trump or Rubio had believed in the collapse of the Cuban system just around the corner, which only needed a little push, the expected thing would have been for them to now resort to some other resource, such as a law that allows them to impose tariffs for reasons of national security for 150 days.
However, almost simultaneously, they have just legalized the sale of fuel to the Cuban private sector , even exempting fuel originating from Venezuela. Not to mention the humanitarian aid , sponsored by the administration itself. All of this, naturally, has more symbolic value than a real alternative for Cuba's energy situation.
The effect of the energy boycott on the vast majority of services, particularly electricity generation and transportation accessible to most ordinary Cubans, cannot be replaced by the limited financial capacity to import of SMEs and the companies that supply them from the U.S., which is where the U.S. government allows fuel to be acquired.
It makes life easier for these micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and creates their own channel to keep them running, but it ensures that none of that fuel can be acquired to benefit public transportation, nor made available to the majority of the population, who also do not have the privilege of having relatives who can pay for the supply of food and other necessities from the U.S.
In any case, although it keeps Cubans in the grip of the blockade, the relative attenuation of the tariff threats that backed the boycott is significant.
Could this threat have been just another form of intimidation, designed to achieve a psychological effect similar to that used by the Inquisition when it displayed instruments of torture to its victims? Or is all this merely a prelude to softening them up, before proposing a genuine dialogue and negotiation, instead of spreading outlandish stories about secret conversations with relatives of the "ruling elite" ?
So, what role do the Miami congressmen play in this charade ? Do they identify with these contradictory corridors of the Administration? Do they trust their gestures, which at times suggest accommodation, a search for concessions instead of unconditional surrender or facing collapse? How much longer does the regime have? Will there be a Delcy RodrÃguez in Havana? Ambassador Hammer, the chargé d'affaires here, promises that the end is coming in the next few months, but “cannot reveal who the Cuban Delcy RodrÃguez is,” or rather, “doesn't want to comment on the matter.”
Putting ourselves in the shoes of those congressmen, isn't it time to remind Trump and Rubio of their commitment to the hard line, which has fueled Miami's political machine for decades?
Thirty years after the Brothers to the Rescue plane crash, which served as the catalyst for the Helms-Burton Act, the time has come to provoke a similar situation. Imagine a group of armed commandos, infiltrated at midnight, as in the years of Operation Mongoose, to carry out attacks, acts of sabotage, actions that precipitate, or appear to precipitate, a definitive Cuban rebellion, and so on.
If the regime's collapse is already inevitable, what could be more opportune than to awaken that rebellious spirit, buried for half a century of Castroism? So that the administration has no other option but to play hardball and finally intervene to support the freedom fighters and stop a civil war that could drive half of all Cubans to cross the Florida Straits?
I know all of the above sounds crazy and a real nightmare for U.S. national security, but it's entirely consistent with the boundless anti-communism of that Cuban-American elite that dominates the political climate in the enclave. And that has been, and continues to be, the main obstacle to a viable national reconciliation process.
Intelligence and decorum
I want to conclude these notes on intelligence and decorum with the meaning of solidarity, beyond ideologies. Some casual observers judge it as nothing more than the handouts others offer us, moved by our deplorable situation. This superficial view not only reflects the prevailing state of confusion but also the search for neutrality in the face of the polarization generated by intimidation. As they used to say in my town, "to bathe in the river while keeping your clothes on."
This new solidarity stems from the feeling of belonging to a single world, where, as Bertolt Brecht said, yesterday they came looking for some, and today for others, and since you did nothing, one day they will come looking for you.
This resurgence of solidarity, which responds to a global vision of justice, without being inscribed in a pre-established ideology, and which also does not appear in intelligence estimates, has a fundamental meaning, however, in the political context of the world in which we live.
Understanding our problems as part of that world, instead of continuing to look at them from our own navel, is crucial.
