My response to “Is the single party reformable?” by Ariel Dacal Díaz, La Joven Cuba, November 18, 2026
https://jovencuba.com/reformable-partido-unico/comment-page-1/#comment-361148 (English translation below)
This is an invaluable essay. In high school I learned the 1887 political
axiom by Lord Acton, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely." This is as true in socialist as in capitalist countries. It
becomes more of a problem when the ruling group is motivated by religious or
ideological faith and well as by thirst for power. The human tendency to see
oneself, and ones friends, as the only people with the wisdom and capability to
govern, is exacerbated by "moral" obligations--or rationalizations.
The Cuban case is complicated by two factors:
- The illusory goal of complete independence from a neighbor's overwhelming culture and economy
- The omnipresent existential threat of political and military conquest by that neighbor
Look what happened to the US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Habeas
Corpus was violated; torture was employed; 136 individuals were extraordinarily
rendered or secretly detained by the CIA. One of the worst prisons in Cuba
employing illegal force feeding of hunger strikers was US controlled Guantanamo
where people have been imprisoned for decades without trial.
It is impossible to know what the real popularity is of Cuba's current
political leaders, including with questionable opinion polls. Authoritarian
control of media and of political opposition invalidate popular judgement by
elections. It is equally difficult to say what public attitudes would be if
there had not been a crippling embargo for six decades and the current oil
blockade. The US has the unilateral power to free Cuba from the deadly threat
of hegemonic aggression. Cuba has the unilateral power to free its people
from one party rule. It would be beneficial to all if both happened through
negotiation but the asymmetrical reality of power complicate sequence and
agency. Absent an honest negotiated agreement, I believe ending the
embargo would make the political evolution more likely. The natural
consequences of a flood of US tourists, trade and investment will transform
official power more than sanctions. Raul Castro's daughter, Mariela, the leader
of Cuba's cultural and legal revolution against homophobia, told CNN in 2012
that without the embargo there would be no need for a one party system. https://cubapeopletopeople.blogspot.com/2026/04/mariela-castro-on-political.html
The comparative situation of Viet Nam is worth considering. It is equally
controlled by a single party. Serious political opponents, often allied with
overseas Vietnamese linked historically to the former US created regime, are
regularly imprisoned. Yet there is little doubt about the authority and broad
popularity of Viet Nam’s government. One factor is that there is great
individual and corporate freedom in economic life. A second is that there is a
highly visible process of collaborative regionally diverse leadership. The
third is a regular turnover of national leadership, roughly every five years.
That brings new networks of power, often provincially based. The new persons do
not challenge underlying assumptions of ideology and power, but they do infuse
different ideas and implementation.
Viet Nam is influenced by and constantly on guard against cultural,
political and military dominance by its much wealthier and powerful neighbor
but does not fall into the trap of indefinite strong man leadership that
afflicts both China and Russia. Worth noting is that the US population is 31.6
times larger than Cuba and China is 13.8 times larger than Viet Nam. Viet Nam
has been struggling to manage its relationship with and protect its
independence from a hegemonistic China for 3,000 years, about ten times longer
than Cuba has been dealing with the US. Fifty years ago it defeated
China’s destructive pro Pol Pot invasion across its norther border. Even
today China illegally occupies Vietnamese territory in the South China /
East Sea, bars oil exploration and interferes with fishing. Viet Nam even
retired its exceptional and visionary Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach after
pressure from China and failure to achieve normalization of relations with the
Carter Administration.
The parallels for Cuba are not exact but are instructive.
**********************************
Is the single party reformable?
La Joven Cuba, November 18, 2026
Is the single party reformable? - Young Cuba
In my university years, I came across the issue of the single party for the first time, consciously and in theoretical and political terms.
Three names were etched on the door through which I entered that debate: Juan Valdez Paz, Jorge Luis Acanda, and Fernando Martínez Heredia. Along the way, other thinkers from the courtyard appeared who added to the flow of that and other concomitant analyses: Aurelio Alonso, Isabel Monal, Rafael Hernández, Hugo Azcuy.
Several colleagues from my generation inherited and expanded those reflections; he scored, among others, Julio César Guanche, Julio Antonio Fernández Estrada, and a little later, Wilder Pérez.
Overall, from different backgrounds and without explicit coordination, a body of analysis has been produced on the single party, which is essential to rescue in view of the necessary Cuban political reform. That body converges on a question: is the single party reformable?
Without intending to cover the coordinates of an answer, I try in this space to suggest a certain order to the ideas contained in that set regarding the architecture of the Cuban political order, the centrality of the single party, the variables that derive from it, all in dialogue with possible paths toward political reform.
The Party Against the Revolution
The analysis of the single party as a socialist political model does not begin in Cuba, but in the experience that served as a mirror and warning.
The Bolshevik party, conceived by Lenin as an instrument of the revolutionary vanguard, underwent a process of "declassification." Their mechanisms of worker participation and control were dismantled, and a new bureaucratic layer—filled with secondary cadres, technical staff inherited from the Tsarist apparatus, and proletarianized peasant masses—appropriated power, knowledge, and the means of idea production.
By the 1930s, that bureaucracy was established as the dominant sector, and its control was not only political but epistemic (determining what counts as valid knowledge, which beliefs are justified, and who has authority to produce or validate knowledge), since besides concentrating decision-making power, it arrogated the authority to define what should be understood by socialism, Democracy and revolution. And so it guaranteed its reproduction for decades through the monopoly on interpreting socialism in general and democracy and its instruments in particular.
The party, which had been prepared to lead the workers, was transformed into an instrument to dominate them. The most serious consequence was the suppression of democracy in general, not just party pluralism.
Without freedom of the press, agitation, and assembly, the dominance of the great popular masses becomes impossible.
The single party became the owner of the truth, hypercentralized decisions, and suffocated the soviets, which were supposed to be the backbone of revolutionary power.
This reading establishes a distinction that runs through the rest of this analysis. The problem is not the existence of a party, but its transformation into a State, a society, and a truth.
The degeneration was not an organizational accident, but the result of a monopoly that, finding no counterbalances, tended toward bureaucratization, censorship, and unanimity.
The architecture of the monopoly
Regarding the Cuban case, more precisely, Valdés Paz identified the core problem in the confusion between party and State. Unlike what is constitutionally prescribed, the party did not exercise its governing function in an equidistant manner between society and the State, but rather as an articulation of both, leading society.
This leadership of a non-elective institution over other elective ones posed a contradiction that only greater democratic development could overcome.
With his thesis of "generational stagnation," Valdez Paz adds that the policy of cadres produces officials dependent on higher directives and reproduces a system incapable of accepting that future generations will produce their own leaderships.
Guanche completes this architecture with a description of the democratic deficit. There is a single party that does not recognize tendencies within it, social organizations without autonomy for their exercise, and elections that are not organized around ideological programs.
Acanda provides the Gramscian toolbox to delve deeper into the mechanism. If the State is the result of organic relations between political society and civil society, the single party that seeks to reflect the political unity of society risks nullifying the autonomy of society and replacing hegemony with coercion or unanimism.
His description of bureaucratization, formalization, ritualization, self-censorship, dogmatic and exclusivist Marxism-Leninism of the model, describes the cultural face of monopoly.
Wilder Pérez adds, in terms of hegemony, that monopoly not only monopolizes decisions, but also the meaning of the project, its contents, symbols, and references.
Aurelio Alonso introduces a distinction that allows for a broader diagnosis. The party as a leadership structure — the party above — is not the same as the party as a space for membership and deliberation — the party below —.
The problem is not that there is a leadership, but that it has colonized the membership, turning the party into a self-referential apparatus that decides for the bases but not with them.
The party above conceives organization as a machinery of leadership and tends to confuse unity with uniformity. Alonso warns that unity is a sign of political health, but one must be careful not to confuse a single party with a united party.
It is not about abolishing that difference by decree, but about rebalancing the relationship between its two halves, so that the leadership is accountable to the membership and to society.
Without real spaces for deliberation, socialism is reduced to a system of reproducing directives.
Martínez Heredia provides the procedural dimension; His idea of the socialist transition as an incomplete feature of the revolution implies that the single party, far from being the culmination of the process, can become its brake if it is not democratized.
Estrada Fernández shifts the criticism toward the legal-institutional field. His diagnosis is not limited to confirming the political monopoly, but formalizes it legally by stating that the Cuban single party operates with a "supraconstitutional" character.
This means that it is neither subject nor limited by the legal framework it itself helps define, which makes the defense of the Constitution a structural challenge. Criticism of the single party is also a criticism of the rule of law that supports it.
What reforms for the single party?
Rafael Hernández adds to this body of ideas that reforming has not been unusual for the party. He stopped considering emigrants as enemies and allowed religious believers to enter starting with the IV Congress (1991). It went from defining itself as the "vanguard of the working class" (1976 Constitution) to "Cuban nation party, Martian, Marxist and Leninist" (1992 reform). It abandoned the reference to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and assumed the role of "the supreme leading political force of society and the State" in democratic socialism.
In his reflection, he specifies a central question: can a single party, to which the majority does not belong, be functional to a democratic system?
The question does not admit a binary answer. To anticipate possible outcomes, the constellation of contributions stated here allows describing three conditions of possibility.
The first would be internal reform. To support trends, programmatic debates, and competitive internal elections. This includes the stable and systematic convening of Party Congresses and the periodic activation of the Party Conference, as forums for deliberation and approval of political strategies.
The second would be functional demonopolization. This implies that the party ceases to be the only actor with decision-making power, allowing the autonomy of social organizations, project competition, and a public sphere that metabolizes the existing plurality.
The third is structural reform, and it decides the fate of the previous ones. If the party remains identified with the State and reserves the final say, internal and functional reforms will be cosmetic.
History shows that a party that monopolizes power tends to reproduce bureaucracy, censorship, and unanimity even when proclaiming democracy.
In this context, reform does not depend on the will of the leaders, but on the correlation of social forces and the existence of autonomous actors capable of challenging the monopoly.
The question about reforming the single party is, at its core, the question of the balance of power capable of forcing it to democratize.
Here lies the most complex issue of the analysis. The single party is reformable, but not by decree. Democratization is a process of struggle, not an institutional design. And that struggle has a problematic subject, because the political monopoly of bureaucracy has precisely destroyed the spaces where that subject could be constituted.
Faced with this contradiction, the only meaningful reform is the one that returns power to the membership, autonomy to civil society, and decision-making capacity to instances different from the fabric of popular power.
Read together, these authors do not offer a condemnation of the Revolution nor an apology for liberal multiparty politics. They offer, namely, an anatomy of monopoly and a warning about its revolutionary limits.
The single party that does not become an instrument of socialist democracy ends up being the instrument of a new caste. Limiting itself to reforming its leadership recreates the gap between top and bottom with new vocabulary.
The underlying reflection to which this article invites is that a democratic system is not measured only by the number of parties, but by the quality of debate, respect, trust, and the collective production of meanings and policies that make them viable.
If that single party can lead reforms toward channels where society names its needs and projects, and at the same time self-reform to make them sustainable, the democratic framework for its functioning would have better guarantees.
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