Are John and Nahal accessing conflicting Administration positions, or are we witnessing good cop / bad cop, trying to pressure Cuba to make concessions? Are Russia, China, Brazil and Mexico so intimidated by the US that they won't defy the tariff threat (which may be nonexistent) and provide life-saving oil? Or do they also feel that Cuba won't make essential economic changes voluntarily?
-- John McAuliff
by John Kavulich
(a business specialist who is a frequent acerbic critic of both governments)
The “embargo” (executive orders, policies, regulations, and statutes) by the government of the United States upon the government of the Republic of Cuba commenced in 1960 during the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration (1953-1961).
The trigger was the 1960 expropriation of an oil refinery owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).
It has continued thus far into fifteen (15) United States presidential administrations- eight (8) Republican and seven (7) Democrat.
The “embargo” continued from the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration through the Kennedy-Johnson Administration (1961-1963), Johnson Administration (1963-1965), Johnson-Humphrey Administration (1965-1969), Nixon-Agnew-Ford Administration (1969-1974), Ford-Rockefeller Administration (1974-1977), Carter-Mondale Administration (1977-1981), Reagan-Bush Administration (1981-1989), Bush-Quayle Administration (1989-1993), Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009), Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025), and thus far continues through into Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029).
Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029), will focus upon being the occupant of the Oval Office who presides at the commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and societal re-engagement with the government of the Republic of Cuba where the dis-engagement began sixty-six years ago with Dwight Eisenhower, President of the United States (1953-1961).
The coveted Nobel Peace Prize would certainly be within range and reach of President Trump should he preside during the “complete and total” commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and societal re-engagement with the citizens, government, and residents of the Republic of Cuba.
Maximalist demands from Washington DC and maximalist demands from Havana will shift gradually to achievable, desirable, doable, implementable, and sustainable.
No one will be entirely satisfied with the outcome, rather outcomes of the conversations, dialogue, discussions, and negotiations by Washington DC and Havana.
Members of the United States Congress will need to accept and adapt to disappointment. They will support President Trump regardless of the agreement(s) he endorses with the government of the Republic of Cuba. Those agreements will be signed not with a regime, but with a government led by Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019-2028). Members of the United States Congress will swallow hard. They will be unable to default to a traditional ego-driven position of invincibility.
Antagonizing President Trump with the message that he did not demand enough, do enough, and go far enough, is risky. His response could well be- “OK, I will return Nicolas Maduro [President of Venezuela (2013-2026)], to Caracas, and you can have back Joe Biden [President of the United States (2021-2025)]. Is that what you want? I have done what fourteen presidents could not do.”
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) provides for the president of the United States to define and determine that a “transition government” is operational in the Republic of Cuba. Individuals who serve in the current government are not prohibited from serving in a transitional government or democratic government.
President Trump will be elastic in defining “transition” and to defining constraining provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, Libertad Act, and Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000.
AUTHORIZATION. (1) IN GENERAL. The President shall develop a plan for providing economic assistance to Cuba at such time as the President determines that a transition government or a democratically elected government is in power.
SEC. 204. TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA. (a) PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS. Upon submitting a determination to the appropriate congressional committees under section 203(c)(1) that a transition government in Cuba is in power, the President, after consultation with the Congress, is authorized to take steps to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba and to suspend the right of action created in section 302 with respect to actions thereafter filed against the Cuban Government, to the extent that such steps contribute to a stable foundation for a democratically elected government in Cuba.
The Trump-Vance Administration will embark upon similar strategies used with the Syrian Arab Republic where some sanctions were removed/suspended for its transition government despite uncertainty as to the short-term, medium-term, and long-term trajectory. President Trump deemed the risk worth the potential reward. The decision also unlocked financing and investment from other countries.
The government of the United States will provide incentives to the government of the Republic of Cuba as it currently inhabits the space. The challenge will be creating incentives that the government of the Republic of Cuba will accept- and they will accept what they believe they can withstand.
The government of the Republic of Cuba will need to continue the process of correlating the words of its political leadership with implementing policies, regulations, and statutes for transitioning the words into operational results.
*****************************
No comments:
Post a Comment